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ABSTRACT 
 
The American University in Cairo 
The Legal Methodology of the Salafi Movement 
By: Brian Wright 
Supervisor: Dr. Mohamed Serag 
 
This study derives the legal methodology of the modern Salafi movement in Egypt. The 
first two sections develop context, pondering global Salafism as well as the effects of the 
Egyptian political, economic, and cultural spheres on the movement's development, while 
the third section discusses the legal opinions of Salafi preachers in the fields of 
democracy, law, economics, women's rights, non-Muslims, Al Azhar, the Shi'a, as well as 
the arts and leisure. Section four synthesizes these opinions to create the general approach 
of the movement to Islamic Law. 
 
This study suggests that each manifestation of Salafism is the result of local 
circumstances, and not part of a global movement. In Egypt, the failures of Nasserism 
and capitalism in the 20
th
 Century resulted in calls for a return to Islam, particularly 
following the 1967 war. Influenced by political Islam as well as Saudi Wahhabism, this 
group of young preachers would grow over the next thirty years to re-define the country's 
religious landscape.  
 
The legal methodology of the Salafi movement is one of selective literalism of the 
Qur’ān and Sunna, without a defined framework such as that of Usūl al Fiqh. There is an 
emphasis on issues of theology and a lack of understanding of modern politics and 
economics. This creates a disconnection with issues on the ground and causes instability 
in the movement as they increase their political participation. However, a sense of 
malleability in legal rulings allows the movement to adapt to changing political 
conditions and provides a method to remain relevant. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
"َّ نإ ََّقَدَْصأ َِّثيِدَحلا َّ بَاتِك َِّالل ََّو ََّنَسَْحأ َِّيَْدهلا َّ يَْده َّ د  مَح  م َّ رَشَو َِّرو  م لأا َاه تَاثَدْح  م َّ ل كَو َّ َةثَدْح  م 
َّ ةَعِْدب َّ ل كَو َّ ةَعِْدب َّ َةَللاَض َّ ل كَو َّ َةلَلاَض ِيف َِّرَانلا.” 
 
“Verily the truest speech is the Book of God, and the best guidance is the 
guidance of Muḥammad. The most evil of all things are novelties, and every 
novelty is an innovation, and every innovation is misguidance, and every 
misguidance leads to the Fire.”1 
 
 The above statement represents the opening lines of the religious speeches, public 
lessons, and lectures given by a movement of Egyptian Muslims who refer to themselves 
as Salafis. Classified in the media as some of the most conservative and observant 
individuals in the country, the movement has often been the subject of serious debate and 
criticism.  
 
 Interest in the Salafi movement has continued to increase particularly in light of 
their unexpected success in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections. During this electoral 
cycle, which was their first official participation in the country's electoral process, the 
largest representation of the Salafi Movement, the Al Nour Party, achieved approximately 
25% of available seats during three rounds. This solidified the Salafis as the second-
largest political movement in Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood and represented a 
                                                 
1 The only narration of this Hadith is found in Aḥmad ibn Shu'aib ibn 'Ali ibn Baḥr al Nasā'ī, Sunan al 
Nasā'ī (Aleppo, Syria: Maktab al Maṭbū'āt al Islāmiyya) Vol 3, Book 19 Salāt al 'Eidain, Chapter 22 
Kayf al Khuṭba, Ḥadīth 1578. 
 However, similar narrations are found in  
 - Muslim ibn al Ḥajjāj al Qushayrī al Nisābūrī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (Cairo: Dār Ihiyā' al Kutub al 'Arabiyya, 
1991) Book Jum'a Prayer, Ḥadith 1427, and 
 - Muḥammad ibn Yazīd al Qazwīnī, Sunan ibn Mājah (Riyadh: Maktabat al Ma'ārif) Book Al 
Muqaddama, Chapter Al Tamassuk bi al-Sunna, Ḥadith 42 and 
 - Ibid., Chapter Ijtināb al Bid’a, Ḥadith 44 and 45, and 
 - Abu Dāwūd Sulaymān ibn al Asha'th, Sunan Abī Dāwūd (Riyadh: Maktabat al Ma'ārif, 1996) Book Al 
Sunna, Chapter Fi Luzūm al Sunna, Ḥadith 3973, and 
 - Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad (Cairo: al-Maknaz al-Islāmī) Musnad Jāber ibn ‘Abd Allah, Ḥadith 14458 
and 15112. 
2 
recognition of their significant influence not only in the religious but political spheres as 
well.  
 
 During and after the electoral process, Salafi candidates and the religious leaders 
who support the movement have begun to re-shape the country's political atmosphere and 
drive the popular debate. They are calling for Egypt in its new constitution to be defined 
as an Islamic state, rejecting calls by most other political and religious groups in the 
country, including the official Al Azhar, for Egypt to be a civil state with an Islamic 
identity.
 2
 Critical to an Islamic state according to the Salafi movement is the application 
of Shari'a or Islamic Law, particularly its more violent aspects such as the Ḥudūd 
punishments. It is this call to change Egypt's future that has garnered the most powerful 
responses from opponents of the Salafis and has turned the local media and academic 
landscape towards seeking a deeper understanding of the movement. 
 
 Criticism of the Salafi movement has been vast, particularly in the days following 
the January 25
th
, 2011 popular protests and the subsequent political upheaval. Academic 
conferences,
3
 written works,
4
 and television programs
5
 have all made their contribution, 
and the Salafis themselves have enhanced their organization to respond to and articulate 
their own thoughts in this new atmosphere.  
 
 However, much of the discussion of the Salafi Movement has been directed at 
secluded outward issues that although concern many liberal Egyptians, fail to provide a 
comprehensive look at the movement. For example, many popular television shows have 
                                                 
2 Ibrahīm Bayūmī Ghānim, “Wathīqat al-Azhar: Al-Naṣ wa al-Naṣr,” Al Ahrām, 9 July 2011, accessed 8 
Apr 2012, http://www.ahram.org.eg/Issues-Views/News/99869.aspx. 
3 Most conferences have not dealt with the Salafi issue directly, but have provided a number of criticisms 
to the goals of the movement, particularly post-2011 Revolution. See the International Conference on 
“Sufism: A Fundamental Methodology for Reform” ( فوصتلا :جهنم ليصأ حلاصلال ) held in Cairo from 24-
26 September 2011 at the Al Azhar International Conference Center. 
4 The most popular of these works that has tackled the Salafi approach with applications has been 
Muḥammad al Ghazālī, Al Sunna al Nabawiyya: Bayn Ahl al-Fiqh wa Ahl al-Ḥadīth (Cairo, Dār El 
Shorouk: 2006). For a more modern work, see 'Ali Juma', Al Mutashaddidūn (Cairo: Dār al Muqaṭṭam, 
2011). 
5 See the show “Al Majlis” on the Egyptian satellite channel “Al Azharī”: http://azharitv.net/index/splash 
3 
highlighted the Salafi rejection of bikinis and claim that a ban on this beachwear will 
have a negative effect on tourism. Other examples of the criticism of Salafism has been 
on the veiling requirements for women or the growing of the beard and wearing of 
traditional robes with raised leggings for men. This approach is specifically directed 
towards the Salafi tendency to mix between individual and organizational, moral and 
legal issues. 
 
 This study seeks to depart from the traditional approach to analyzing the Salafi 
movement as either an ignorant group of Muslims or simply unwanted extremists and 
begin to chart a deeper understanding of what the Salafi movement in Egypt represents. 
This will be done through an analysis of the works of the Salafi movement. As a corridor 
for understanding, this study uses the modern legal opinions of prominent Salafi 
speakers. From an analysis of these opinions, the goal of this study is to extract the 
principles that constitute the methodology of the modern Salafi movement in Egypt. 
 
Research Methodology 
As will be described in Chapter 2 of this study, the Salafi Movement in Egypt can 
be divided into four different categories. The first two are divided by time: those who 
founded the modern movement in the 1970s and received the majority of their education 
abroad or those whose popularity increased in the 1990s and began teaching in the 2000s 
with significantly reduced foreign experience. Additionally, within each generation there 
are two general groups into which preachers can be classified: those who are associated 
with official Salafi organizations such as the Da’wa Salafiyya in Alexandria and those 
who speak independently. In order to provide as wide a spectrum as possible of Salafi 
opinions in Egypt, an effort was made to draw speakers from each of these four 
classifications. 
 
It was the original intention of this study to conduct personal interviews with each 
Salafi preacher selected from the four groups above. The proper ethical approval was 
obtained from the university administration and questionnaires were prepared 
4 
accordingly. However, as time progressed it became clear that the preachers chosen for 
this study were not interested in participating. They did not respond to repeated attempts 
at personal contact, nor could an alternative method of communication be found through 
their students or accquaintances. As a result, in order to present relevant and recent 
material for the analysis of legal opinions, a decision was made to utilize new media 
sources. 
 
A Note on Sources 
 In order to provide the most accurate picture possible of the modern Salafi 
movement in Egypt, this study utilizes as many different sources available including 
YouTube, internet sites, and recordings of public lectures, alongside printed works. This 
method of presentation is relatively new in the field of Islamic Studies, and therefore it is 
necessary to present a limited justification of how these resources were used.
6
 
 
1. The Salafi movement is based upon popularity, and is a direct reflection of 
Egyptian society. From the issues covered in their debates, to their relationship 
with the state and even the backgrounds of the most prominent Salafi speakers, 
catering to their audience is critical for the movement's survival. Therefore, the 
methods used in communication for the Salafi movement must be those that can 
easily reach the largest audience possible, hence the use of new media. 
 
2. Much of the Egyptian political, cultural, and religious landscape is currently being 
re-defined through the use of new media outlets including satellite channels, 
recorded lectures in mosques and in the streets, conferences, and the Internet.
 7
 
The Salafi movement is no exception to this trend and actively uses these new 
methods as the primary avenues through which they communicate to the public. 
Although printed works are available, these are usually geared towards a more 
                                                 
6 It is the intention of the researcher to further expand on the validity of new media sources such as social 
networks and YouTube in later work. 
7 Lina Khatib, "Communicating Islamic Fundamentalism as Global Citizenship," in Journal of 
Communication Inquiry, 27, 4, October 2003, 389 – 409. 
5 
academic audience and are limited in scope, with very few supporters of the 
movement actively reading their printed materials. 
 
3. Finally, there have been significant changes in the political power structure in 
Egypt following the 2011 Revolution. During this period, the Salafi movement 
entered politics for the first time and began exerting an entirely new dimension of 
influence on the country's discourse. This has been too recent, however, to allow 
many Salafis to articulate their opinions in published works. For example, the 
Majlis Shūrá al Ulemā’, a collection of Salafi preachers who have come together 
to create a more unified voice in their rulings, have posted all of their information 
online and have held most of their meetings live on satellite channels, making 
citations of their opinions only available through these sources. 
 
 For YouTube specifically, One of the primary concerns of utilizing it as a medium 
such is the ability of the uploader to cut recordings and take messages out of their context 
to promote a particular opinion, placing the status of videos from the site as primary 
sources into question. When approaching YouTube, this study uses videos that have either 
been uploaded by official Salafi sources such as satellite channels (Al Nas, Al Raḥma, or 
al Ḥikma, or Ḥāfez), websites such as AnaSalafy.com or SalafVoice which are connected 
to the Da’wa Salafiyya in Alexandria. In cases where these videos are not available from 
their official sources, videos of full episodes uploaded by individuals were saught.  
 
 Search terms used to find particular rulings were typically the name of the ruling 
requested followed by the preacher. For example, searching in the field of women’s rights 
and the niqab debate, the search terms would be “Ḥukm al-Ḥijāb Muḥammad Ḥassān” or 
“Ḥukm al-Niqāb Muḥammad Ḥassān.”8 
 
Roadmap 
                                                 
8  The actual Arabic text entered as the search term would be: 
“مكح باجحلا دمحم ،ناسح مكح باقنلا دمحم سحنا” 
6 
 Before the movement in Egypt can be understood, it is important to begin with the 
construction of a global context. Salafism, as many studies have previously mentioned, is 
not a movement isolated to Egypt, nor is it the product of individuals writing solely in the 
20
th
 or 21
st
 centuries. It is therefore necessary to understand the origins of Salafism and 
how this term has been used by different groups of Muslims throughout history. Is 
Salafism an independent doctrine with roots dating back to the first generations following 
the Prophet Muḥammad, expressing the one true representation of Islam? Or is it a 
response to the theological discussions of later generations of Muslims who were 
influenced by Greek philosophy?  
 
 Unfortunately, the time and space limitations of this study do not allow for a 
complete discussion of this subject, nor to provide an exhaustive look at the use of 
Salafism throughout the fourteen centuries of Islam. Rather, the first section of this study 
seeks to provide a simple historical connection and global context to what is occurring in 
Egypt and begin to understand what Salafism is in general. 
 
 The second section of this study will then construct the national context in which 
the Salafi movement grew, particularly in the second half of the 20
th
 and first decade of 
the 21
st
 century. This section will explore the political, cultural, social, and economic 
changes that occurred during this period around which the modern Salafi movement 
developed, attempting to answer the question of under what circumstances did the Salafi 
movement arise. At the end of the second section, a brief biographical sketch will be 
provided of some major living members of the Salafi movement, charting their 
background, education, and social status as well as their current place in the movement. 
 
 After providing the context of the Salafi movement and describing some of its 
prominent figures, the third section of this study then charts their modern legal opinions. 
These opinions will be provided in the fields of democracy and the nature of the state, 
application of Islamic Law or Shari'a, the foundations of the Islamic economic system 
and banking, women's rights, the place of non-Muslims in the state, the position and role 
7 
of Al Azhar, the approach to the Shi'a, and opinions regarding the arts and leisure 
activities.  
 
 Following these opinions, the fourth section of the study will then present a sketch 
of the methodology of the Salafi movement. What scholars had the most influence in 
their thought? How do they present their ideas to the public, using what sources and 
methods? And where do they see themselves in opposition to the rest of society? 
 
Note on Transliteration 
 This study utilizes the standard Arabic transliteration methods throughout with 
one major exception: in situations where an author has publications in English, the 
popular transliteration of the name will be provided. Examples of this exception include 
Yusuf al Qaradawi and Fahmy Huweidy.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
CHAPTER 1: 
Defining Salafism 
 Starting from a linguistic point of view, the word Salaf in Arabic literally means 
that which preceeds, such as the front lines of a military.
 9
 Religiously, the word is used 
referring to the previous generations of Muslims. This meaning can be general or, in more 
modern contexts, refer to the first three generations of Islam after the Prophet 
Muḥammad: the Companions, their Followers, and the Followers of the Followers. The 
term Salaf is often placed in opposition to the term Khalaf, which linguistically is defined 
as what is behind
10
 and religiously as any later generation of Muslims, particularly after 
these three.  
 
 However, this issue is not simply one of linguistics, but rather goes to the core of 
religious beliefs. Writers considered major figures in the Salafi movement such as Nāṣir 
al Dīn al-Albānī argued that the first three generations of Muslims represent a pure form 
of the religion, before Muslim society was exposed to the ideas of philosophy that caused 
divisions within the society. They had their own system of belief and practice, that was 
based solely on the direct interpretation and understanding of the Qur’ān and the 
Prophetic Traditions, or Sunna. This practice represented the only correct version of 
Islam, and should be followed by all.
 11
 The official religious body of Saudi Arabia has 
also issued a ruling which states that Salafis are all those who follow the path of the first 
generations of Muslims, and therefore are on the only correct path of Islam.
12
  
 
Use throughout History 
 Unfortunately, even according to sources of those defending Salafism, there is no 
clear definition or presence of Salafism from the original sources of Islam.
13
 There are no 
                                                 
9 Muḥammad ibn Mukarram ibn Mandhūr, Lisān al-‘Arab (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir) 9, 158. 
10 Ibn Mandhūr 9, 82. 
11 'Amr 'Abd al-Mun'eim Selīm, ed, Al-Masā'il al-'Ilmiyya wa al-Fatāwa al-Shar'iyya (Tanta: Dār al-Diā', 
2006) 29 - 30.  
12 Fatāwa al-Lajna al-Dā'ima, Vol 2, P 243, Number 1361, accessed 12 Feb 2012, 
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?View=Page&PageID=611&PageNo=1&BookID=3. 
13 Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al Maghrāwī, Al-Maṣādir al-'Ilmiyya fi al-Difā' 'an al-'Aqīda al-
9 
Qur'ānic verses that mention such a division and there is only one Hadith quoted by 
Salafi sources that specifically mentions the subject.
 14
 However, it should be noted that 
this Hadith refers specifically to the memorization and relation of the Qur'ān, and has 
nothing to do with a division in the Muslim community. If Salafism existed from the 
early stages of Islamic history, it would require more time to develop, and that 
“information had to be sifted, Hadiths and reports had to be assessed and, ultimately, 
subjective choices had to be made.”15 Therefore, this could not have been done by the 
first few generations and had to have arisen much later, once the Muslim world had 
become exposed to alternatives methods of thought. 
 
 Another popular explanation of the roots of Salafism is through the movement's 
apparent attachment to the Hadith as presented by modern scholars such as Muḥammad 
‘Imāra.16 Therefore, it is argued, the first Salafis were members of the Ahl al-Ḥadīth. 
These scholars, who were based in the early regional schools of Islam such as Medina, 
arguably preferred an attachment to the Hadith and the examples of the Companions for 
the derivation of their law and beliefs, staunchly opposing their counterparts or the Ahl 
al-Ra'y who favored the application of independent judicial reasoning.
 17
 This division 
became more pronounced as the writing of Traditions became more popular and was 
influenced by Muslim attempts to elevate the status of the Hadith. Eventually a 
distinction was made in the Abbasid Period, during the development of the 'Ulamā’ class 
and the expansion of theological and philosophical discourse. Scholars such as school 
founders al Shāf'ī and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal would elaborate on the idea, but it would 
eventually reach its peak at the crystallization of the Hanbali school in the 4
th
 century of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Salafiyya (Riyad: Dār al-Rāya, 1996). 
14 “...So fear God and be patient, for I am the best predecessor for you...”  
 ...“يقتاف الل يربصاو ينإف معن فلسلا انأ كل”... 
 - Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl al Bukhārī, Al Jāmi' al Ṣaḥīḥ (Cairo: Maṭābi' al-Amīriyya, 1312) Vol 8, P 64, 
Book al Isti'dhān, Chapter Man Najā bayn Yaday al Nās, and 
 - Muslim, Vol 4, P 1904, Book al Faḍā'il, Chapter Faḍā'il Fāṭima bint al Nabī, Ḥadith 98.  
15 Henri Lauziere, The Evolution of the Salafiyya in the Twentieth Century through the Life and Thought of 
Taqi al-Din al Hilali (Dissertation to Georgetown University, 2008) 36. 
16 Muḥammad ‘Imāra, Izālat al Shubuhāt 'an Ma'ānī al Muṣṭalaḥāt (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2009) 31-43. 
17 Encyclopedia of Islam, 2
nd
 ed., s.v. “Raʾy (a.),” accessed 04 April 2012, 
http://www.brillonline.nl.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-8869.  
10 
the Hijra / 10
th
 century CE
18
. However, this argument appears to be equally vague, with 
some even arguing that Salafis are rather remnants of a rogue Hanafi sect strongly 
attached to the Hadith
19
. However, these opinions show a great deal of confusion and a 
lack of understanding amongst modern scholars. 
 
 Salafi defenders have conducted their own research as to the origins of Salafism. 
By conducting this process, they are attempting to create a chain of Salafi scholars back 
to the earliest generations of Muslims, which would lend a much greater level of 
legitimacy for their movement. Some, for example, quote Al Sam'ani (d. 562 Hijra / 1167 
CE) in his Al Ansāb, claiming that he makes a mention of a group known as the Salaf.20 
However, upon looking at the source, the quote that numbers no more than a few lines 
states very vaguely “This is a reference to the Salaf and the association to their school of 
thought, or so I have heard.”21 Others will argue that some of the earliest scholars of 
Islam were in fact Salafi, such as the four Imams of Sunni Jurisprudence
22
, 'Abd al-Razāq 
Al Ṣan'ānī (126 – 211 Hijra / 744 – 827 CE), Ibn Abī Shayba (159 – 235 Hijra / 775 – 
849 CE), and the writers of all six major Hadith collections.
23
 Additionally, during this 
process of legitimization, other works and a number of websites defending Salafism 
make reference to scholars that are little-known in academic circles such as Abu Naṣr al-
Sajazī (d. 444 Hijra / 1052 CE).24 Very little is known about the life of this individual and 
only one work attributed to him: a letter to the people of Zubayd regarding the status of 
the Qur’ān, has been published in Saudi Arabia.25 He is reported to have written another 
                                                 
18 Wael B. Hallaq, “Hanbali School of Law.” In Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North 
Africa, edited by Philip Mattar (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2004). 
19 Aḥmad Zaghlūl Shalāṭa. Al Hāla al Salafiyya al Mu'āsira fi Miṣr. (Cairo: Madboulī, 2011) 31-32. 
20 “Statements from the Salaf on Ascription to the Salaf,” Salafi Publications, last modified 10 Jun 1998, 
accessed 4 April 2012, http://www.salafipublications.com/sps/, article ID: SLF10001. 
21 Abī Sa'd 'Abd al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad al Ṣam'ānī, Al Ansāb (Beirut: Dār al-Janān, 1988) 3, 273: 
"يفلسلاَّ:حتفب نيسلا ،ملالاو يفو اهرخآ ءافلاَّ.هذه سنلاةب ىلإ فلسلا لاحتناو مهبهذم ىلع ام تعمس" 
22  Abū Hanīfa, Mālik Ibn Anas, Al Shāfi'ī, and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. 
23 The writers of the six Hadith collections are: Al Bukhārī, Muslim, Al Nasā'ī, Abu Dāwūd, Al Tirmidhī, 
and Ibn Mājah; Al Magrāwī, 13-32. 
24 “Abu Naṣr al Sajazī,” ‘Aqīdat al Salaf al Ṣāliḥ, last modified 31 May 2009, accessed 6 March 2012, 
http://www.as-salaf.com/article.php?aid=35&lang=ar/. 
25 Abu Naṣr al Sajazī, Risāla ila Ahl Zubayd fi al Radd 'ala man Ankara al Ḥarf wa al Ṣawt (Riyadh: Dār 
al Rāya, 1993). 
11 
major work on Islamic theology, the Ibāna Kubrá, however no printed edition has 
appeared and this study has been unable to locate any reference to the work in the 
Brockelmann catalogue.  
 
 What these studies tend to miss, however, is that the use of the idea “Salaf” 
stretches far beyond these random citations, and in fact the term was used extensively by 
other groups of Muslims as well and not just those opposed to kalām schools. At the end 
of the 5
th
 Century of the Hijra Abū Hāmid Al Ghazālī in his famous work of spirituality, 
Ihiyā’ 'Ulūm al Dīn, frequently makes strong general references to the Salaf, backing 
each principle he introduces with a connection to what the previous generations of 
Muslims believed or practiced. Most of these references are without specific mentions of 
a particular person or group of individuals. In his introduction, he clearly references the 
first three generations of Muslims: 
 
 “As for the knowledge of the path that leads to the Afterlife and what the 
 Righteous Salaf followed from what God Almighty called in his book deep 
 understanding, wisdom, knowledge, enlightenment, light, salvation, and guidance, 
 has become among the Creation dissolved and forgotten.”26 
 
Another writer, Shams al Dīn Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Mālik al Daylamī (died after 589 
Hijra / 1193 AD) wrote a work validating the chains of Sufism through the use of the 
term Salaf.
27
 
 
The “Founders” of Salafism 
 After the founding centuries of Islam, most Salafi works tend to base their 
opinions on the works of one particular individual: Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm ibn 
Taymiyya (661 – 728 Hijra / 1263 – 1328 CE). According to Salafi writers, particularly 
for our purposes those who represent the movement in Egypt, the conclusions reached by 
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Ibn Taymiyya created Salafism, and that his was the first serious attempt to reclaim the 
religion from those who had corrupted it.
28
 His writings strongly attacked the position of 
mystics and philosophers, accusing them of straying from the truth of Islam. However, 
Ibn Taymiyya in only a small section of his large collection of Fatwas does he make a 
reference to an attachment to the first generations of Islam or what could be vaguely 
defined as Salafism.
29
 Immediately following Ibn Taymiyya in his importance is his 
student, Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (691 – 751 Hijra / 1292 – 
1349 CE). He largely advocated the same principles of his teacher and argued against the 
positions of the philosophers. 
 
 Neither of these individuals, however, makes any clear distinctions that they are 
themselves Salafi nor that there is a difference between the Salafi movement and the rest 
of Islam. Their arguments were part of traditional debates between Muslim scholars of 
theology. What drove both of these writers to take such strong positions in their debates 
was the historical context in which they wrote. Both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim 
were contemporaries to the destruction of the Mongol invasion as well as the Crusades. 
These wars resulted in deep divisions in the Muslim society that pushed these writers to 
derive the opinions that they promoted.
30
  
 
Reform Movements 
 In the 18
th
 century, the picture of the Muslim community had changed 
significantly, and a number of new figures appeared, by far the most widely-discussed 
and controversial is Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (1703 – 1792). Born into the Najd 
region of what is today central Saudi Arabia, he obtained his education through 
traditional means and eventually led a campaign across the Arabian Peninsula to rid the 
Muslims by force of what he referred to as shirk. His seminal set of works, which consist 
                                                 
28 “Bid’a and Its Influence on the Tribulations of the Muslims.” Recorded tape of a lecture given by Abu 
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30 ‘Abd Allah Muḥammad Jār al Nabī, Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyya wa Juhuduhu fi al Difā' 'an 'Aqīdat al 
Salaf. Doctoral dissertation to the College of Shari'a, Umm Al Qura University, Saudi Arabia, 1984. 
13 
of a set of short letters that have been gathered together by his followers known as the 
Risā'il al Tawḥīd, describe what further explanatory texts would call the pure version of 
Islam
31
, expressed usually in no more than a few short Qur’ānic verses and Prophetic 
Traditions. 
 
 'Abd al-Wahhāb's mission began to gather momentum after creating a pact with 
the Al Saud clan. This alliance and new political backing would allow the Wahhabi 
movement to spread throughout the Arabian Peninsula, and even make short incursions as 
far north as Karbala in Iraq. This movement, although eventually put down by Ibrahim 
Pasha of Egypt in 1818
32
, would continue to develop in the desert villages. In the early 
20
th
 Century, the alliance between the Saud and 'Abd al-Wahhāb families would come to 
prominence again and, along with significant British and American help
33
, form the 
backbone for the Saudi monarchy which stands to this day. 
 
 In India, Shah Walī Allah al Dahlawī (1703 – 1762) called for a removal of the 
divisions within the Muslim community and that they should unite under what he called a 
“banner of truth.” Born into a family that traced its roots to the family of the Prophet 
Muḥammad, he received his religious education primarily at the hands of his father until 
his death when al Dahlawī was only sixteen. He then later traveled to the Hijaz to 
perform pilgrimage, spending two years studying Hadith in the region between 1143 and 
1145 Hijra, or approximately 1730 – 1732 CE.34 
 
 Al Dahlawi's two-volume Ḥujjat Allāh al Bāligha or the Convincing Evidence 
From God describes in detail the greater purposes of God's Law and calls people to turn 
away from practices of shirk, or the association of partners with God.
35
 This law, or the 
Shari'a, is seen by al Dahlawi as perfect and covers every possible aspect of life, leaving 
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no room for other types of secular, and divisive, legal systems.
36
 The introduction, written 
by prominent Muslim Brotherhood scholar Sayyid Sābiq,37 states that one of the main 
reasons Islam failed to spread heavily in India is that many of the scholars who taught in 
the country were polluted by foreign ideas such as Greek philosophy.
38
 This work 
continues to be used as a primary text in Indian religious schools and retains a large 
popular following across the Muslim world, including at least four separate printings in 
Egypt. 
 
 In Nigeria, another movement was started by Usuman dan Fodio, known in 
Arabic as 'Uthmān ibn Fūdi (1754 – 1817). At the heart of his most popular work, Bayān 
Wujūb al Hijra 'ala al 'Ibād, he establishes the fact that many of the regions of modern-
day Nigeria are ruled by non-Muslim princes, and therefore all true Muslims must heed 
the call of the Qur’ān and the Prophetic Sunna to leave these places,39 establishing their 
own community which would ultimately be under his leadership. The resulting 
population movement and religious revival would change the face and social makeup of 
the country as well as surrounding African nations. Although researchers have stated that 
this movement was based primarily on the principles of Sufism such as that of al 
Dahlawi, recalling 'Uthman's upbringing and his connections to the Qadiriya sect,
40
 his 
primary focus is on innovation in the religion or bid’a. He claimed that some areas of the 
country continued to follow unorthodox practices such as receiving blessings from trees 
and rocks even though there is a Muslim majority in these regions.
41
 
 
 In Yemen Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al Shawkānī (1759 – 1834), born a Zaydi Shi'a but 
eventually moved to Sunni Islam, led another reform movement set in the midst of 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 9 - 11.  
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38 Ibid., Y. 
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conflicts between the weakened Qasimi Imamate and the Zaydis.
42
 Based on the re-
introduction of intellectual reasoning or ijtihād, he believed strongly that blindly 
imitating rulings without knowing their underlying textual evidence was forbidden. He 
was also a strong textualist, rejecting many of the traditional concepts of the 
Fundamentals of Jurisprudence such as consensus (ijmā') and analogy (qiyās), opinions 
that would be adopted by Salafis in the 20
th
 century. Using this ideological foundation, 
Shawkany and the judges who followed him would re-organize Sunni society in Yemen, 
marking the transition from a traditional to a modern state before the introduction of 
British colonialism in the mid-19
th
 century.
43
 
 
 Although claiming to focus on innovation in the religion and purification of local 
populations, each of the movements described above had significant political goals as 
well. As with Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, the environments in which they 
developed were neither theoretical nor abstract, reflecting a return to textualism or 
purification of the religion from the influences of philosophers. Rather, they all 
developed around real-world situations and worked to solve problems that were faced by 
Muslims at the time. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb was tied directly to the Bedouin tribal system of 
Arabia, al Dahlawī used religious power to organize against the advancing British 
occupation of the Indian subcontinent, and Ibn al Fūdi fought against the influence of 
corrupt princes of the tribes in northern Nigeria.  
  
There were other reform movements during this time period, however based upon 
entirely different religious backgrounds. Studying with Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb was Sayed 
Aḥmad Khan from British India, who would return to his homeland after spending time 
in the Hijaz and form a religious movement that would eventually lead to major uprisings 
against the British in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, culminating with the Mutiny of 1857. 
Contrary to Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, Sayed Aḥmad’s movement was strongly connected to 
mysticism, using its system of allegiance to create a strong following. Bordering at times 
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on radicalism, at one point during his message he even claimed himself to be the Mahdi, 
and long after his death the future leaders of his group would claim to be able to interpret 
his will from the grave.
44
 
 
Modernization 
 In the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 Centuries, a modern reform movement would take hold 
in the Arab world. Born in Iran and raised as a Shi'ite, Jamāl al Dīn al Afghānī would 
eventually grow to become one of the modern Muslim world's most prominent figures, 
driving a reform movement based on a response to the Western occupation of Muslim 
lands as well as corrupt local rulers. A strong advocate of Islamic revolution, Afghānī 
believed that the solution to Muslim problems was unification, and that only a strong 
Muslim world would be able to counter the advances of occupation. 
 
 Following in Afghānī's footsteps would be his Egyptian student, Muḥammad 
'Abdu. After the failure of the Urābi Revolution and the full British occupation of the 
country he was forced to leave the country, seeking refuge with a teaching position in the 
Maqāsid Institute of Beirut. It was during this time that he changed his message from the 
overtly political rhetoric of Afghānī towards the internal re-organization of society from 
its roots, including reforms to education and the establishment of modern Arab liberalism. 
After returning to Egypt, he began the work of instituting these societal changes through 
his writings and religious rulings. A number of his students would become critical to the 
reform movement in Egypt and across the Muslim world, each taking on a specific 
subject: Sa'd Zaghloul in his revolution, Qāsim Amīn for women's liberation, Ali 'Abd al- 
Rāziq for liberalism and politics, literature and criticism with Ṭaha Ḥussayn, and Musṭafá 
'Abd al-Rāziq in philosophy.  
 
 The dawn of the 20
th
 century, however, would see the ideas of pan-Islamism 
replaced with a strong wave of nationalism beginning with the success of the Kamalist 
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Revolution in Turkey, which destroyed the Caliphate and placed the Muslim world in 
disarray. The response to this change would be conservative, led by figures such as 
Rashid Reda who defended the place of Islamic tradition and its institutions.
45
  
 
 Afghānī, ‘Abdu, and Reda would all refer to the ideas of the Salaf, however 
arguably simply meaning the principles of the first three generations of Muslims. They 
felt that Islam was at one point in its earliest history pure, and that a number of thoughts 
and ideas such as mysticism, Shi'ism, and philosophy had come to destroy this perfect 
state, trapping the Muslim world in a system of mere imitation and causing their political, 
economic, and cultural state to decline. This society of imitation was the very definition 
of bid’a, and that Muslims must return to what they had done for centuries: re-interpret 
their religion to accommodate for modern changes in society.
46
 
 
 At the core of this movement was a call to a new understanding of the Qur’ān and 
Sunna, leading a number of writers to identify this movement as a form of modern 
Salafism.
47
 However, there is no clear indication that any member of this movement ever 
referred to themselves in this way. Similar to the movements of the 18
th
 century, these 
figures were reacting and adapting to the circumstances of their time, namely Western 
occupation. 
 
 However, by the middle of the 20
th
 century, the term Salafism would transform in 
its usage and association from reform and modernization to what is more popular today. 
Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia began using the term when they needed to detach themselves 
from the writings of Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb as his writings came under 
increased scrutiny.
48
 This appropriation of the term Salafi was not an incredibly massive 
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feat for the Wahhabis, as both they and thinkers such as Muḥammad 'Abdu placed the 
removal of bid’a as a primary goal, albeit with each group approaching the subject 
differently. 
 
Summary 
 From this very brief historical overview, it appears that there are multiple opinions 
as to the roots of Salafism, the most dominant as an opposition to approaches to theology 
known as the science of kalām, such as the Ash'ari school started by Abu Ḥasan al Ash'arī 
(260 – 324 Hijra / 874 – 936 CE) and the Mu'atazalī school founded by Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā' 
(131 Hijra / 700 – 748 CE). Salafis claimed that these schools were infiltrations of Greek 
philosophy, ideas foreign to what they saw as an originally “pure” Islam. Modern Muslim 
scholars such as Muḥammad ‘Imāra as well as Western studies such as those cited at the 
beginning of this chapter would attach this drive for purification to a general trend in 
Islam towards an attachment to the original texts of the Qur’ān and Sunna. 
 
 As for the term Salaf itself, a wide range of Sunni Muslim thinkers throughout 
history have at one point or another made a connection to the concept. This was then 
further elaborated as a preference for the earlier generations of Islam. This term, 
therefore, does not refer to a particular movement or form of thought, but rather was used 
as a method of legitimization of ideas and methodology and to increase its popularity, 
such as in theological debates between adherents of the Ash’arī and Mu’atazalī schools. 
 
 But why was such legitimacy necessary? There are two general reasons: a general 
attachment to the past and the avoidance of bid’a. As has been mentioned by classical 
scholars such as the instructor of al Bukhari, ‘Abd Allah ibn Mubārak (118 – 181 Hijra / 
736 – 797 CE), one of the strongest advantages to the Islamic system of knowledge and 
learning is the presence of Isnād or the chains of knowledge and traditions which can be 
traced accurately back to their source, proving their legitimacy.
49
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 As history progressed and new ideas began to enter into the Muslim community, 
there was a continuing struggle to maintain this connection to the earlier generations and 
legitimacy in the face of collapsing institutions and colonialism. In the modern world, 
this struggle is often described by modern writers as a conflict between heritage (Turāth 
or Aṣāla) and modernization (Ḥadātha). A number of different works have been written 
on this topic, analyzing the philosophical, legal, and theological balance that each author 
believes should be made in order to create an interpretation of Islam that is compatible 
with modern life.
50
 
 
 The second reason for this need of legitimacy, and considerably more specific 
than the first, is the avoidance of accusations of engaging in a practice of innovation in 
the religion or bid’a. Linguistically, the word itself means to establish or begin 
something. Religiously, however, this refers to the concept of innovation or the 
establishment of something new in the religion after its completion.
51
 This innovation, 
according to traditional scholars, is divided into two distinct groups. The first includes 
those innovations that are allowed in the religion and are beneficial to Muslims and their 
faith. Often-cited is the action of the Caliph ‘Umar, who ordered that the night prayers in 
the month of Ramadan, which were performed in the time of the Prophet Muḥammad at 
home, to be done in public. Upon seeing the result, he proclaimed: “What a blessing this 
innovation is!”52 The second form of bid’a is that which is negative or has a detrimental 
effect on Muslims and society which is recognized as forbidden. 
 
 Reform movements typically classified as “Salafi” such as those described earlier 
in this chapter considered all innovations as negative and made their removal the 
cornerstone of their message. This drive tends to be the only shared concept between 
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historical groups and the modern manifestation of Salafism in the Islamic world today. 
 
 Therefore, the approach taken by scholars of describing Salafi ideas as a reaction 
to innovation and an attempt to legitimize Islamic thought in light of the original texts is 
legitimate, however very abstract. If one were to look at each of the movements and 
figures claimed by modern authors to be Salafi, one finds that each of these movements 
appeared and developed in light of particular historical and societal circumstances that 
pushed them into existence. Salafism therefore is less connected to general religious 
trends, and has much more to do with what is going on in the societies where these 
movements thrive. 
 
A Group or Not? 
 After this summary, an important question remains: is the Salafi movement an 
independent group of Muslims, representing a separate theological approach? According 
to most Salafi works themselves, this particular issue is one of considerable debate and 
confusion. The fatwá from Saudi Arabia cited at the beginning of this chapter states that 
Salafis are all Muslims who follow the Qur’ān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, 
and the first three generations of Islam. However, in the following ruling of the same 
collection, when asked which groups are closest to the truth of Islam, the ordered 
response is the Ahl Al Sunna who are the Ahl Al Ḥadith, then the Anṣār al Sunna, and 
then the Muslim Brotherhood.
53
 The Saudi Fatwa Committee does also maintain a bit of 
confusion that all of these groups are partially right and wrong, and that they should be 
dealt with as long as they advocate what is correct according to the Qur’ān and Sunna in 
the issues of theology, and rejected for all things that contradict the true beliefs.
54
 
 
 Ibn ‘Uthaymīn, a prominent Saudi scholar and mentor of a number of members of 
the movement in Egypt, provides a slightly different approach to Salafism, describing 
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that there are two different concepts of Salafism. The first is a political movement which 
seeks to divide Muslims and is therefore entirely forbidden. The second, however, is the 
true path of Islam, which follows the Qur’ān and Sunna.55 However, in his other 
discussions, he states that Muslims are not simply Salafi by virtue of them being Muslim, 
but rather they must actively work to adopt certain principles that remove the bid’a from 
their belief and practice which causes them to separate from the rest of the Muslim 
population and become Salafi
56
, a clear indication that this is a separate group of 
Muslims. 
 
 Nāṣir al Dīn al-Albānī, in his fatwa collections, makes similar statements. Any 
attachment to a group in Islam, whether this might be in the form of a school of 
jurisprudence or theology, is entirely forbidden in the religion.
57
 He even extends his 
opinion to state that such strong attachment to these groups has led to significant rifts in 
the Muslim community, to the point where even the mosques are designed to 
accommodate the different schools of law, and that separate prayers take place where 
students of each respective school pray in the way of their school founders. However, 
according to him there is such as thing as the Salaf, which is the only group of Muslims 
that should be followed. 
 
 Critics of the Salafi movement such as Sa’īd Ramaḍān al Būṭi would draw 
attention to this contradiction, stating that Salafis are attempting to create a form of No 
Madhhab, marking one of the most dangerous moves in Islamic history.
58
 Ultimately, it 
appears that much of the discussion of a historical Salafism is an anachronism, based 
largely on the modern views and needs of those who currently self-identify as Salafis. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
History of the Movement in Egypt 
 Creating a historical image of the Salafi movement in Egypt is a difficult process. 
This is not an organized and defined group such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as described 
in the first chapter of this study, and is rather a collection of individuals. Additionally, as 
was discussed in the first chapter of this study, the ambiguity of the term Salafi and its 
use by such a wide spectrum of Islamic groups also makes even the association of a 
movement much harder to discover. The main figures observed for this study can be 
broken into two main groups: those who joined the movement earlier in their lives and 
those who joined later.  
 
Group 1: Foreign Education 
Most individuals in both groups were all born between the years 1947-1962 and 
those from the first group primarily began preaching in the mid to late 1970s and early 
1980s. They come mainly from primarily rural and lower-class backgrounds, and showed 
no major interest in the religious sciences in their early life. Like most Egyptians in this 
period and social class, in their childhoods they attended government schools through to 
the high school level and in the afternoons were given a general introduction to the basics 
of their faith from those in their community. Many of them had also completed the 
memorization of the Qur’ān by the time they were fifteen, usually at the hands of a 
family member.  
 
 After finishing high school, these young Egyptian men then left their villages and 
moved to larger cities for higher education, usually attending one of the country's two 
largest universities based in the capital, Cairo and Ain Shams. They achieved degrees in a 
range of subjects, which usually had little to do with religion. It was during this time as 
college students that what would become the main figures of the Salafi movement would 
be fully exposed to the problems of Egyptian society.  
 
 At this point, it is necessary to depart slightly from the stories of the Salafi 
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movement and discuss briefly the changes that had occurred in modern Egypt. The 
military coup in 1952, which had overthrown the ruling monarchy, brought with it the 
goal of freeing Egyptians from the grasps of foreign occupation and control. The policies 
enacted by the new President Jamāl 'Abd al-Nasser, who came into power in 1954, 
further solidified a form of new socialism backed by the power and central organization 
and planning of the armed forces. 
 
 On the economic front, the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s led to a large 
expansion of the Egyptian economy. The agricultural plantations which had for years 
been the backbone of the upper-classes was broken up and given to the lower classes of 
the society, re-distributing wealth. Industrialization, combined with heavy restrictions on 
imports, caused increased economic growth levels and made Egypt wealthier than it had 
been in a century.
59
 The new government also began to nationalize a number of foreign-
owned institutions and used the funds acquired to offer Egyptians, particularly those in 
the countryside, a larger package of social services including free healthcare, guaranteed 
employment, and heavily-subsidized basic services such as electricity water, and bread.
60
 
 
 Before the Revolution, the urban middle and upper classes had used their access 
to education as a barrier between them and the poorer rural classes. Under the Nasser 
regime, however, public education was now made available to a much wider spectrum of 
society. The number of students in Egyptian universities skyrocketed, which subsequently 
led to the intense overcrowding of the existing facilities and a decrease in the overall 
quality of education.
61
 
 
 These factors combined to cause major shifts in the overall Egyptian society. Poor 
Egyptians who were previously restricted to rural areas were now moving in large 
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numbers into the cities, using the opened education system, increased public sector jobs, 
as well as social services to achieve a higher social status. These shifts and shocks for 
many arriving in the cities have been discussed by economists such as Galal Amin
62
 and 
appeared in literature of the time in the works of authors such as Aḥmad 'Abd al- Mu'aṭi 
Ḥejāzī.63 
 
 By the end of the 1960s, however, many of these ideals and promises made by 
Abd al-Nasser for a successful, developing society free of foreign control had come into 
serious question. The first major blow came in 1967 when Egypt witnessed a crushing 
defeat by the Israeli army, leaving almost all of the country's defenses in disarray and the 
Sinai Peninsula in the hands of the Israelis.
64
 This defeat would lead to a costly rebuilding 
of the Egyptian army, which would bring the country into large amounts of public debt 
that would further cripple the Egyptian economy as a whole and place it at the hands of 
its creditors.
65
 But the defeat of 1967 was not solely an issue of the military, but rather it 
placed the fundamental ideas of the 1952 Revolution and Nasser's policies into 
question.
66
 How could Egypt, a country that had freed itself from colonial rule and 
witnessed such a successful period of economic expansion and cultural growth, be so 
easily crippled by what was a much smaller, much younger, Jewish nation? 
 
 This issue represented the focal point of public discourse in Egyptian society after 
1967, and the discussion continued to grow well into the 1970s. The solution quickly 
became calls for a return to Islam. A strong connection to religious foundations, given its 
historical successes, was the only way that Egyptian society would be able to return to its 
previous strength. 
 
 Writer Muḥammad Jalāl Kishk, who had previously been a strong advocate of 
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socialism but had since turned to Islamism, wrote that it was Israel's strong connection to 
its religion and dedication to its cause that had caused it to succeed, and that Arab 
nationalism had failed because it had relied on a secular instead of religious backing. In 
his description of Al Azhar, he presents his veiled criticism of the Nasser regime: 
 
 “When Al Azhar was built Arab civilization possessed all the knowledge 
 foundations to set-off  an industrial revolution, if two storms had not struck the 
 Islamic world: the Crusades and the Mongol destruction...Modern civil society 
 then transformed into a rough military society, and the scholars pulled back for the 
 armed forces to rule...and the nation's resources were pushed and bled out in 
 war...cities and farms were burned and all the remnants of civilization were left at 
 the hands of the coming invaders, or the retreating defeated armies.”67 
 
In another article in the same collection, he then states his message more clearly: 
 
 “...Why didn't the Renaissance and civilization movements succeed in the 
 building of a modern Arab state until today? The answer to the second question is, 
 simply, that Al Azhar didn't lead this movement, and therefore it didn't succeed 
 nor become central, nor was it able to move the depths of the public for the sake 
 of an uprising of modernization...rather it remained simply a flake on the 
 surface.”68 
 
 At the academic level the International Institute of Islamic Thought and its 
founder, 'Abd al-Hamīd Abū Sulaymān, dedicated itself to creating what he referred to as 
re-building Islamic knowledge and heritage through a new understanding of Western 
sciences. He felt that this Islam-West knowledge cooperation would allow for an Islamic 
renaissance to take place.
69
 
  
 The desire of the youth in Egypt and the Muslim world as a whole to return to 
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religious principles would be described in detail by Muslim Brotherhood preacher Yusuf 
al Qaradawi. In a number of works, he described what he was witnessing as an 
“Awakening,” where the Muslim youth were beginning to regain the awareness of their 
own heritage and chart their own path. This awakening would lead, in his own view, to a 
complete re-organization of society at all levels based upon the over-arching principles of 
Islam.
70
 
 
 Unfortunately, however, it was clear that at this time the traditional centers of 
Islamic leadership in Egypt were not sufficient to guide this religious resurgence. The 
role of Al Azhar, for example, had been placed on the sidelines through deep connections 
to the state. The waqf system, the primary method through which its and many other 
religious activities in the country were funded, had been subject to a number reforms in 
the 20
th
 century and was brought under the full control of the Nasser regime beginning 
with the passing of Law 247 of 1953 regarding family charities, with a number of other 
legal reforms aimed at the country’s religious endowments passed within the following 
decade.
71
 In 1963, Law 103 was passed that added a number of new secular faculties to 
Al Azhar, placing enormous pressures for change upon its leadership and heavily 
decreasing their influence on society.
72
 Therefore, it was necessary for the would-be 
Salafis to search-out an alternative outlet for their religious needs. 
 
 The existing Islamic alternative in Egypt to Al Azhar at the time was that of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. However, throughout the 1950s and 60s, the movement was the 
subject of relentless state-sponsored repression, leaving most of the higher-ranking 
members of the movement either in prison or executed.
73
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 In 1973, the oil embargo placed by the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, 
resulted in the spiking of the price of oil and the influx of money into these economies, 
which the Saudi government then used to spread their interpretation of Islam: 
Wahhabism. This was carried out not only through a policy of using large amounts of 
money to create dominant Islamic institutions such as the Organization for Islamic 
Conference (OIC) and the Muslim World League as well as publish works and support 
authors who promote Wahhabi ideas. This allowed them to take over the discourse of 
other traditional Muslim societies, sidelining those in the mainstream.
74
 
 
 As a result of this increased Saudi wealth and influence, starting from the late 
1970s, almost all of the members of the Salafi movement in Egypt spent some time in 
Saudi Arabia. It is also mentioned prominently in many of the biographies of Salafi 
leaders that their travel to Saudi Arabia was the first occasion when they began their 
“true” religious studies at the hands of their scholars, and that they had only been 
partially interested in Islamic sciences before their visit. Some members of the movement 
mentioned that they openly continue their connection to Saudi Arabia, visiting the 
country for the purposes of continuing their education as well as religious pilgrimage.  
 
 Almost none of this study, however, was carried out at Saudi Arabia's official 
religious universities such as Umm al Qura in Mecca or the Islamic University in 
Medina. Rather, these studies usually consisted of attending private lectures and readings 
of Islamic texts in either the homes of their teacher or in a local mosque. It is also 
important to note that many biographies of the Salafi leaders in Egypt state that they 
spent very little actual time in lessons, and that on some occasions simply greeting a 
major Saudi sheikh during the pilgrimage in Mecca or making a special journey to visit 
them in a mosque was sufficient to place him on their list of teachers and influences. 
 
 Additionally, during the mid- to late-1970s a number of Azhar-educated scholars 
also became attracted by Saudi influence, and perhaps the most well-known of these 
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individuals is 'Abd al-Laṭīf Al Mushtuharī. Al Mushtuharī was born in 1915, graduated 
with a degree in Religious Sciences in 1944 and was appointed as a state-recognized 
preacher in 1947, by the 1970s had become highly involved in the Salafi movement and 
became the head of the Shari'a Society or the Jam'iyya Shar'iyya
75
 in 1976, what had 
come to be one of the largest non-state Islamic institutions in the country.
76
 
 
 The influence of Saudi Arabia is critical to understanding the spread of the Salafi 
movement in Egypt.  Before the middle of the 1970s, there is no discernible presence to 
this movement. None of the current members of the Salafi movement mention any major 
Egyptian figures who classified themselves as Salafis or claimed to be part of the 
movement. In most of their biographies, the Salafis list almost exclusively Saudi 
influences, and the only Egyptians who are mentioned are figures known for their anti-
regime stances, such as 'Abd al-Hamīd Kishk. The knowledge that they obtained from 
these figures is never discussed and mentioned only generally, indicating that they were 
not considered a major influence, but rather are used as a way to disconnect themselves 
from the religious stances of the regime. 
 
 It should also be noted that travel of Egyptians to Saudi Arabia after the embargo 
of 1973 and the expansion of the Saudi economy was not limited to those who traveled 
for religious or academic purposes. Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians immigrated to 
Saudi Arabia as well as other Gulf nations during this period for work in the expanding 
oil sector. Their impact on the economy and culture of Egypt upon their return in the 
1980s and 1990s has been the subject of extensive discussion amongst sociologists.
77
 
 
 Upon returning to Egypt after their time in Saudi Arabia, these future Salafi 
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preachers then began to speak to the public. Due to limitations in media access and heavy 
state control, their influence remained severely limited to regional mosques and the 
surrounding villages. They also began to publish and present their opinions against that of 
the prominent religious leaders of the time, usually through smaller pamphlets that were 
widely available. They also sought to spread their message beyond their traditional rural 
platforms by recording their lectures and sermons on cassette tapes, bypassing the state-
controlled radio stations.  
 
 In Alexandria, a group of these college students including Muḥammad Isma'īl al 
Muqaddam, Aḥmad Farīd, Sa'īd 'Abd al-'Adhīm, and Muḥammad 'Abd al-Fattāh, fresh 
from their influences in Saudi Arabia founded in 1977 a program that they called the 
Salafi School, acting as a break-off movement from the Jamā'a Islāmiyya, a more 
politically violent group at the time that had connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Over time, this group would eventually grow to become the Da'wa Salafiyya of 
Alexandria, one of the largest and most highly-organized groups of Salafis in the 
country.
78
 
 
 As time passed, the influence of these preachers began to grow, and they were 
now being welcomed to considerably larger speaking venues, again usually in mosques, 
in the larger regional capitals. Their numbers of followers had continued to increase, 
largely due to an increasing library of printed pamphlets and cassette tapes. They also 
started to hold regular lessons in major regional cities, bringing in students from the 
surrounding areas. Some of these students would eventually enhance their standing to 
constitute the second group of Salafi preachers. 
 
Group Two: Local Dependence 
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 This new group of Salafi speakers, although from roughly the same generation as 
Group 1, began preaching at a much later period in their lives at around the latter half of 
the 1980s and through to the 2000s. They also came from backgrounds that were much 
more diverse, and even though many continued to follow the traditional pattern of a 
lower-class, rural background with little religious education some, including ‘Umar ibn 
‘Abd al-‘Azīz, Māzin Al Sirsāwī, and Muḥammad al Saghīr for example, completed their 
religious training from Al Azhar in the fields of Comparative Religion, Hadith, and Da'wa 
respectively. The former two are now professors in their respective departments.  
 
 With the availability of the teachers from the first group of Salafis and a growing 
list of publications and lectures from both Saudi Arabia and Egypt, there was no longer 
the need to travel outside of the country to obtain their education, as they had all that they 
required in Egypt to support the movement. However, many in this second group still 
travel to Saudi Arabia regularly. 
 
 Socially, many of the factors that had promoted the growth of the first group of 
Salafi leaders continued to remain the same, or had become further accented. Gaps 
between the rich and poor had continued to grow, economic progress had become 
stagnant and the country had been pulled into a significant amount of foreign debt that it 
was unable to repay. Academically, the public education system had dragged behind 
under increasingly larger numbers of students, limited facilities, and budgets. 
 
 The Muslim Brotherhood, crippled by decades of violent repression from the 
regime, remained under extreme pressure from the government. However, during this 
time it had built-up an extensive social network that gave it the political support of the 
lower and middle-classes, ensuring them the position as the only formidable political 
alternative to the regime.  
 
 By this time Al Azhar, which was still under the complete control of the state, had 
started to become more aware of the Salafi movement and begun to respond. The most 
31 
vocal of these individuals was Muḥammad Al Ghazālī, whose works directly attacked the 
opinions of Salafis. However, despite this increased awareness, Al Azhar remained 
incapable of impacting the growth of the Salafi movement because of its clear 
connections to the state. Preachers who had graduated from Al Azhar were seen as simply 
the religious arm of the state, and therefore held no public legitimacy. In one of his most 
important works attacking Salafism, Al Sunna Al Nabawiyya Bayn Ahl al Ḥadith wa Ahl 
al Fiqh, Al Ghazālī laments the position of Al Azhar and the rise of Salafism: 
 
 “But Al Ahzar for thirty years or more has collapsed in the leadership and 
 scientific aspects. This has left the way empty for every croaker
79
 and proceeded 
 to place the half or tenth educated at the front of the caravan, causing tribulation 
 rather than putting it out. And so spreads the Bedouin jurisprudence, and the 
 childish depictions of belief and law.”80 
 
 In the 1980s, the Egyptian government led by President Hosni Mubarak, in 
response to the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981, began a severe 
crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups that promoted either 
participation in the political process or, in more violent instances, advocated for the use 
of violence against the regime and its agents. The Salafis, during their education in Saudi 
Arabia, had been taught that participation in the political process was not allowed, and 
many members of the Salafi movement had repeatedly condemned all forms of public 
protest and discouraged any form of participation in the political sphere. This was 
extremely attractive to the regime and presented an alternative to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Therefore, it instituted a policy among its security services of leaving the 
members of the Salafi movement to preach as they wished.  
 
 This proved to be an advantage for the Salafis, allowing their movement to 
continue its growth unabated. It was also during this time that the movement began to 
gain significant numbers of followers in urban areas. This remained the state of the Salafi 
movement in Egypt until the introduction of satellite television and the Internet in the late 
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1990s and into the 2000s.  
 
 In the new century, a major shift occurred in the Salafi movement that allowed it 
to further expand: an introduction to politics following the overthrow of the Mubarak 
government in public protests that began on January 25
th
, 2011. Although their 
participation during the protest movement was not highlighted, a number of Salafi 
speakers such as Muḥammad Ḥassān did speak to the media regarding the issue, asking 
the youth protestors to remain calm and voice their opinions peacefully.
81
  
 
 In the following months, the first true political participation of the Salafi 
movement was that during the referendum of the constitutional amendments. According 
to the Salafis, if the amendments were not passed, this would allow liberal forces in the 
country to write a new constitution, removing Article Two.
82
 In response, they launched a 
comprehensive campaign in support of the amendments, helping to secure their passing. 
In celebration of the victory and what would become a famous media gaff, Muḥammad 
Ḥussein Ya'qūb was recorded at a mosque in the Imbaba neighborhood of Cairo stating 
the chant of the conquering of Mecca by the Prophet Muḥammad and that the passing of 
these amendments marked the coming of Islam in Egypt. If any person was not in 
agreement with the Islamic nature of the Egyptian state, then they should leave.
83
 This 
speech quickly became known in Egyptian media as the “Battle of the Ballot Boxes.”84 
 
 On the 12
th
 of June, 2011, the founding of the first official Salafi political party 
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was approved by the government authorities, marking their official entry into the political 
system
85
 and the third political party established after the Revolution, following Ḥizb al 
Wasaṭ and Ḥizb al Ḥuriyya wa al ‘Adāla. Liberal observers such as Ibrahīm 'Issá found 
this quick registration shocking, quoting that the large financial sums of money required 
to established such a party hinted that there was foreign funding involved,
86
 however no 
evidence was ever produced to these claims. 
 
 The Nour Party was then quickly joined by two other Salafi political parties, Al 
Asāla established on August 28th87 and Al Binā' wa Al Tanmiya on October 9th.88 They 
came together to form a single block in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, and 
eventually won a total of 24% for the lower house
89
 and 25% for the upper house.
90
 
  
 The result of this public development for the Salafis following the removal of the 
Mubarak regime has served to significantly formalize the movement and increase the 
public profile of its members. Speakers tied with the Salafi movement are no longer 
restricted to mosques and their religious channels, but have become popular leaders in 
their own right, pressing their issues upon even the country's largest religious figures.
91
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 Another development has also occurred, although still in its foundational stages. 
Nine of the country's most prominent Salafi preachers
92
 have formed what they are 
calling the Majlis Shūrá al 'Ulamā’, or the Council of Scholarly Recommendation, 
designed to offer a unified Salafi voice in both religious and political issues. This is 
clearly an attempt to counter the influence of Al Azhar and the Dar al Iftā', the country's 
two official religious institutions that have traditionally been the primary sources for 
religious debate. Among their four meetings and 19 official statements as of April 2012, 
the Council has commented on politics, defended members of the council against 
accusations from other Salafi figures, and voiced their opinions on major events.
93
 
 
Methods of Communication 
 There are two shared characteristics between all of the forms of communication 
used by Salafis: their unofficial nature and their ease of access to the general Egyptian 
public. It is through ensuring through any means necessary that their message is heard by 
the largest audience possible, avoiding traditional government controls that they have 
been able to so strongly increase their influence. 
 
 What seems to further the ease of access to Salafi material is price. For example, 
for the initial work of this study, a number of Salafi works were purchased in the Al 
Azhar neighborhood of Cairo, in an alleyway lined with bookstores catering to students 
of the religious university.
94
 On one occasion in February of 2012 the researcher 
purchased 25 Salafi works, the majority of which were hardbound and one consisted of 
four volumes, for a total 450 LE (approximately $75). Opposed to this would be the work 
of Kanz al Rāghibīn, a single two-volume classical text of Shafi'i jurisprudence, which 
was purchased on the same day in the same location for 200 LE (approximately $33). 
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 In the 1990s and early 2000s, two new mediums appeared on the public sphere 
that were not subject to the traditional state controls, which allowed the movement to 
bring their message to the widest audience possible: the internet and satellite television.  
 
 According to a report published at the end of 2010, the government estimated that 
approximately 23 million Egyptians, or approximately a third of the country has regular 
access to the Internet,
95
 with millions more having sporadic access. Websites that 
promote the Salafi movement based from Egypt such as Anasalafy.com have thousands 
of users, and have even begun to organize public lectures attracting major speakers from 
the Salafi movement.
96
 Additionally, one of the most highly organized groups in the 
country, the Da’wa Salafiyya in Alexandria, runs a website called SalafVoice, with an 
equally large following.
97
 
 
 More recently, the spread of social networking and its use by Egyptians to 
organize politically has also been utilized by Salafis, with a number of groups promoting 
Salafi presidential candidates,
98
 defending the reputations of prominent Salafi speakers,
99
 
or even to invite non-Salafis to interact with members of the movement at a local coffee 
chain to reduce public fear of the more extreme preachers.
100
 
 
 The first Islamic satellite channel in the Arab world to broadcast the Salafi 
message from Egypt was Al Nās. With its initial programming in 2006 it played music, 
dance, and weddings, but within six months had changed to broadcast a strict form of 
Salafism, arguably because it would bring in significantly more profits.
101
 The speakers 
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on this channel would then slowly split-off, leaving to found their own channels 
including Al Rahma, Al Hikma, and Hafiz chronologically. Each of these channels is 
known for its respective sheikhs who act on the administrative boards and as supervisors. 
Al Rahma for example is supervised by Muḥammad Ḥassān, Al Hikma is supervised by 
Abu Isḥāq Al Huwainī. 
 
 The relationship of these channels with the government remained benign, with the 
Egyptian authorities largely avoiding confrontation with their increasingly violent 
programming, allowing many of these satellite channels to quickly become some of the 
most-watched in the country.
102
 On October 19
th
, 2010 however, in an unexpected move, 
the state-owned satellite operator NileSat chose to suspend the licenses and stop the 
broadcast of channels Al Rahma and Al Hikma.
103
 The official reason given to the 
closures was that these channels had not paid the necessary licensing fees, however 
others associated to the channels believed that this was a move by the government to 
restrict popular religious speech that was becoming increasingly more politically 
oriented.
104
 
 
Position in the Salafi Movement 
 One of the clearest conclusions that can be derived from the discussion above is 
that the Salafi movement is largely a popular one, and that the hierarchical placement of a 
preacher of the Salafi movement is based purely upon public popularity based largely on 
their position in the media. The wider a particular speaker's media presence, the more 
books they have published, and the more they position themselves as religiously 
legitimate, the higher position they achieve. 
 
 Alternatively, if a member of the Salafi movement makes a remark that is seen as 
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inappropriate or garners a negative public response, the individual is immediately isolated 
from public conversation, condemned, and usually makes an apology, then reducing his 
profile for a short period before returning. An example of this would be the “Battle of the 
Ballot Boxes” incident as described above. After the statements issued by Muḥammad 
Ḥussein Ya’qūb Egyptian media outlets, both liberal and Islamist, universally condemned 
the remarks. He quickly issued an apology and then went for almost four months without 
any major public appearances. 
 
Selected Biographies
105
 
 What follows here are a selection of biographies of prominent members of the 
Salafi movement whose opinions were utilized for the following chapter of this study. 
 
Yāsser Burhāmī106 
 The current manager of the Salaf Voice website, Yasser Burhami was born in 1958 
in the Delta city of Kafr al Dawwār in the Buhaira governate. In 1982 and 1992 he 
obtained his Bachelor's and Masters in medicine and pediatrics respectively, and in 1999 
received a general diploma in Shari'a from Al Azhar University. 
 
 He has written a number of works on the Salafi movement, the first an 
explanation of Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's Kitāb al Tawḥīd in 1980. He currently 
lives in Alexandria and teaches at the Furqan Institute for training religious preachers. 
 
Wagdy Ghuneim
107
 
 Wagdy Ghuneim was born in Alexandria in 1951, and received his Bachelor's in 
Business Management from Alexandria University in 1973. Although focusing largely on 
business practices, he also holds a Masters and Doctorate from the Graduate Theological 
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Foundation, an interfaith religious college based in the U.S. state of Indiana. Both of 
these degrees are reportedly in Jurisprudence, however the college has never offered such 
a program and only awards a general degree in Islamic Studies that does not include 
Islamic law.
108
 
 
 Due to his past membership in the Muslim Brotherhood and his frequent 
discussions on politics, Wagdy Ghuneim has been forced to frequently move to different 
nations of the world, including Bahrain, South Africa, the United States, Britain, and 
Yemen, each state being forced out and banned from returning. He currently appears 
regularly on Salafi satellite channels such as Al Nas as well as posts audio and video 
messages on YouTube expressing his opinions on current Egyptian events. 
 
Muḥammad Ḥassān109 
 Born in the village of Demouh in the Daqahliyya governate in 1962, Muḥammad 
Ibrahim Ḥassān came from a poor rural family. However, they gave him a slightly 
stronger background in religious studies at a much earlier age, allowing him to memorize 
the Qur’ān and give religious speeches to members of his community until his later 
childhood. He attended government schools, and eventually traveled to Cairo for 
university, graduating with a degree in Media Studies from Cairo University. During his 
university studies, colleagues remarked at his already growing attention to religion and 
ability to communicate and convince his peers,
110
 however there is no indication that this 
came from any type of formal studies. In the summer of his first year of university 
studies, Muḥammad traveled to Jordan to attend lectures of Al Albānī, however for only a 
few weeks. 
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 After graduating he enrolled at the Higher Institute for Islamic Studies in Cairo, 
however left due to his military obligations, never to complete these studies. After 
finishing his term in the military, Muḥammad then settled in the city of Suez, giving 
lessons and preaching on Fridays. It was during this time that he began to travel to Saudi 
Arabia regularly, and began to attend lessons at the hands of many of their scholars 
including 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Bāz and Ibn 'Uthaymayn. During one celebratory occasion, 
Ḥassān was asked to give a speech in front of a large group of visiting Saudi scholars, 
who were so impacted by his words that they immediately rewarded him with a Doctorate 
degree. After completing his studies, he then moved to Saudi Arabia for a period, living 
in al-Qaṣīm and eventually teaching at the local branch of the Imam Muḥammad Sa’ūd 
University in the fields of Shari'a and Uṣūl al-Dīn. 
 
 Today, Muḥammad Ḥassān is the religious supervisor of the Rahma satellite 
channel as well as the newly established Al Rahma daily newspaper. He was also 
awarded a PhD from Al Azhar University's College of Islamic Calling after the defense of 
his dissertation “The Methodology of the Prophet Muḥammad in Calling the Other.” 
 
Abu Isḥāq Al Huwainī111 
 Born Ḥijazī Muḥammad Sherif in the village of Huwein from the Kafr el Sheikh 
governate in June of 1956, he reportedly changed his name during his religious studies to 
imitate the Companion Sa'd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ.112 He completed his education through the 
high school level in public government schools, and reportedly did not have any keen 
interest in religious studies until he reached the last year of high school. During his exam 
time, he visited his brother in Cairo and began attending the Friday sermons of 'Abd al- 
Ḥamīd Kishk in the Ain Shams district of the city. He became intrigued by Kishk’s 
attention to Hadith, and upon leaving a mosque happened upon a book by Al Albānī. He 
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purchased this book and then began studying in detail the sciences of Hadith, relying 
almost exclusively on the works of Al Albānī. 
 
 Ḥijazī then enrolled for university studies and graduated with a degree in Spanish 
Literature from Ain Shams University, and in the evenings attended lectures in 
jurisprudence given by Muḥammad Najib al Muṭi'i as well as a number of random public 
religious lectures given by professors at Al Azhar, known in Arabic as the “Sheikh al 
'Amūd” sessions. His high performance in school won him a scholarship to study in 
Spain but spent little time in the country and quickly returned as he became more 
religious. 
 
 There is an indication in his biography that at one point he traveled to Saudi 
Arabia to study and met with Bin Bāz, Ibn 'Uthaymayn, and Ibn Qa'ūd. None of this 
study, however, was consistent and is reported to have been nothing more than either a 
few short sessions or questions. 
 
 Although Abu Isḥāq al Huwainī is reported to have been a student of Al Albānī, 
defended his rulings on a number of occasions, and even teaches his works to students, he 
only met his mentor twice: once for a few days at his home in Jordan in 1986 where he 
asked Al Albānī a number of detailed questions regarding Hadith sciences, and the second 
time in 1989 when he greeted him at the pilgrimage in Mecca. 
 
Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ Abu Isma'īl113 
 Born in the Cairo Metropolitan area in the village of Kafr Tuhurmus, Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ 
Abu Isma'īl is a lawyer by training and received his legal education from Cairo 
University. After spending much of his adult life at a private practice, in 2005 he began to 
enter public life when he was elected to the higher council of the Lawyer's Syndicate. In 
May of 2011, he officially announced his intentions to run for President of Egypt in the 
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2012 elections and has received the support of most Salafi preachers as the primary 
Islamist candidate. 
 
 Much of Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ Abu Isma'īl’s reputation and knowledge comes directly 
from the work of his father who was a prominent scholar at Al Azhar University and an 
active politician throughout the 1980s. Ḥāzim’s official campaign website has as its 
second link a full description of his father's life and suggests that it was his father's 
influence and interest in politics that drew him to run for the presidency. 
 
Muḥammad 'Abd al-Maqsūd114 
 Alongside Muḥammad Hussein Ya’qūb, Muḥammad 'Abd al-Maqsūd is an older 
member of the Salafi movement in Egypt, born in 1947 in Manoufiyya. His education 
was entirely through secular public schools, and he achieved his bachelors, masters and 
doctorate in Agriculture from Al Azhar University, and worked for a period as an 
engineer in the Plant Disease Research and Prevention Center, under the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
 
 Unfortunately, very little is known or published about the religious education of 
Muḥammad 'Abd al-Maqsūd, and the very small amount of information available on the 
internet suggests him as Egypt's top jurisprudence scholar, and that he has attended a 
number of religious conferences both in Egypt and internationally.  
 
Muḥammad Isma'īl al Muqaddim115 
 Born in Alexandria in 1952, Muḥammad Isma'īl al Muqaddim was educated in the 
country's public school system and received a Bachelor's in medicine and is currently 
completing higher studies in mental and nervous system illnesses at Alexandria 
University. During his undergraduate studies, he came into contact with Aḥmad Farīd, a 
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fellow Salafi preacher, and began to become interested in religious pursuits, particularly 
preaching to the society about their wrongs and how to improve them to get closer to the 
correct version of Islam. 
 
 After a brief period of interaction with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamā'a 
Islāmiyya, he then cooperated with Aḥmad Farīd and Sa’īd ‘Abd al-‘Adhīm to found the 
Salafi School of Alexandria in the early 1970s. 
 
Aḥmad al Naqīb116 
 Born in a village in the Daqahliyya governate, Aḥmad al Naqīb holds a Bachelor's 
Masters and Doctorate in Arabic Language and Linguistics from Cairo University, and 
spent much of his life moving around the Delta and in Cairo with his family as well as for 
his personal studies. He attended private lessons held by some of the country's most 
prominent lecturers on Fundamentals of Islamic Jurisprudence, including 'Abd al-Fattāh 
al Sheikh, the former President of Al Azhar University. He also claims to have listened to 
a lecture given by Al Albānī in his (Al Naqīb’s) village, although there is no evidence that 
Al Albānī ever visited that area, and also regularly reads and listens to lectures given by 
Abu Isḥāq al Huwainī and Aḥmad Farīd. 
 
 He currently lives in the Delta city of Mansoura where he teaches Islamic Studies 
at the College of Education at the local university. He also gives a number of weekly 
lessons and delivers the Friday sermon in a popular Salafi mosque in the city. 
 
Muḥammad Sa'īd Raslān117 
 Unfortunately, very little is known about the life of Muḥammad Sa’īd Raslan, 
only that he was born in 1955 in the Manoufiya city of Ashmoun. His education was 
public, and he received his Bachelor's in medicine from Al Azhar University. Later, he 
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then obtained a Masters and Doctorate in Hadith Sciences, making him an exception to 
the general rule discussed above that most of the first group of Salafis in the country 
received no formal religious education. 
 
 He currently travels around the countryside giving lectures on religion, as well as 
delivers the Friday sermons at his home mosque. 
 
Ayman Ṣaydaḥ118 
 One of the youngest of the Salafi preachers, Ayman Ṣaydaḥ is from the 
Daqahliyya governate and was according to his biography known locally as a famous 
soccer player. He obtained his Bachelor's in commerce in 1988 and then traveled to Saudi 
Arabia to begin his “true path of religious studies.” Among his influences and teachers 
were Bin Bāz and ibn 'Uthaymayn, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Kishk, Abu Ishāq al Ḥuwainī, 
Muḥammad Ḥassān, Muḥammad Ṣafwat Nūr al Dīn, and Muḥammad Ḥussein Ya’qūb.  
 
 His first preaching attempts were at a Salafi-controlled mosque in 1995 in the 
'Izbat al Nakhl neighborhood of Cairo, and he has continued to preach Friday sermons in 
the 10
th
 of Ramadan City as well as the Al Imān Mosque in Cairo. Ayman also works as 
an accountant on the side until, as he states, he can reach the financial point where he no 
longer has to work and can focus entirely on religious studies. 
 
Māzin Al-Sirsāwī119 
 Māzin Muḥammad Al Sirsāwī was born in the village of Bani ‘Āmir, close to the 
city of Zaqāzīq in the governate of Sharqiyya, and has spent the majority of his life in the 
Zaqāzīq area. He focused the earlier portion of his life in the study of Qur’ān, 
memorizing it and reciting it for the local radio station while he was a teenager. 
Reportedly during a reading of Al Albānī's Hadith he decided to change his focus to the 
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detailed study of Hadith.  
 
 His education was through the local Azhari schools, and he entered the Zaqāzīq 
branch of Al Azhar for university, at the college of Usūl al Dīn and Da'wa. He completed 
his doctorate from the same university, and eventually began teaching, where he currently 
holds a position as Associate Professor of Hadith at Al Azhar University, Zaqāzīq branch. 
His biography reports most of his teachers as Egyptians including Aḥmad Mu'īd 'Abd al- 
Karīm, Abu Isḥāq al Huwainī, Muḥammad 'Amr 'Abd al-Laṭīf, Muḥammad Ḥussein 
Ya’qūb, and Muḥammad Maḥmoud Abu Hashim. 
 
Abd al-Mun'im al-Shaḥḥāt120 
 Another member of the Alexandria School, Abd al-Mun'im al Shaḥḥāt was born in 
the Egyptian coastal city of Baltim in the Kafr al Sheikh governate and graduated with a 
degree in electronic engineering from Alexandria University in 1993. During his college 
years he became highly attached to the Da'wa Salafiyya, studying with a number of their 
prominent preachers including Yāsser al-Burhāmī. He has written a number of articles in 
the group's official newsletter, al Bayān, and was responsible for the management of the 
Salaf Voice website before reaching his current position as the official media spokesman 
of the Da'wa Salafiyya. 
 
 Al Shaḥḥāt ran for parliament in 2011, however lost in the recount. He currently 
gives a number of lectures in mosques throughout Alexandria as well as on Salafi satellite 
channels. 
 
Muḥammad Ḥussein Ya’qūb121 
 One of the older members of the Salafi movement, Muḥammad Ḥussein Ya’qūb 
was born in 1955 in the village of Mo'atamadiya in the Giza Governate. This is currently 
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an urban neighborhood on the Western outskirts of Cairo, however in the 1950s very little 
development existed on the Western banks of the Nile and the area was an isolated 
farming village. The oldest male in his family, his father was reported to be very 
religious, establishing the Jam'iyya Shar'iyya branch for the area. However, there was no 
indication that he took religious lessons and he completed his education through the 
secular school system. 
 
 For his university studies, he entered into the College of Education and graduated 
with a primary teaching degree. However, he quickly found work in Saudi Arabia as a 
school teacher, where he lived for five years from 1980 – 1985. It was during this time, 
according to his biography, that he seriously began his religious studies. After 1985, he 
returned to Egypt, however he frequently visited Saudi Arabia for work as well as study. 
He studied with 'Abd al-'Azīz bin Bāz from 1982-1985, attending his lessons after 
morning prayer, spent a period of six months with Ibn 'Uthaymayn in 1990, attended the 
Friday prayers and visited the home of 'Abd Allah ibn Qa'ūd. He also attended the lessons 
of many other individuals however not regularly, the majority of whom were from Saudi 
Arabia with a few from Egypt such as Usāma Muḥammad 'Abd al-'Adhīm al Shāfi'ī and 
Rajā'ī al Masrī al Mekkī. At the bottom of his biography, it is interesting to note that he 
lists among his teachers Muḥammad Nāṣir al Dīn Al Albānī, whom he merely saw at 
pilgrimage and spoke with him on the phone twice. 
 
Conclusions 
 In conclusion, by far the greatest advancement of the Salafi since their modern 
appearance in the Egyptian landscape was their entry into politics following the 2011 
political uprising and the overthrow of the Mubarak regime. This shift would mean that 
Salafis are no longer speaking only in village mosques or the crowded neighborhoods of 
the capital, but also under the dome of the Parliament and in high-ranking ministerial 
positions. Their legal opinions would therefore also now become center-stage, as they 
begin to enter into the national discourse. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
Legal Opinions 
This chapter discusses the legal opinions of the Salafi movement in a number of 
different fields of Islamic thought including their approach to democracy, the application 
of Shari’a, economics, women’s rights, non-Muslims, Al Azhar, the Shi’a, as well as arts 
and leisure. These subjects were chosen as they represent the key issues towards the 
establishment of a future Egyptian state, one that, according to Salafis as mentioned in 
the introduction, should be staunchly Islamic. This Islamic nature must be more carefully 
defined. While their lack of formal organization creates some difference in the views of 
individual preachers, the opinions below reflect a general representation of those who 
self-identify as Salafi leaders as well as those who have a large television and speaking 
presence.  
 
Democracy 
 The definition of democracy for the Salafi movement is focused on the 
understanding of the source of governmental power and law. If law and power is derived 
from or determined by human sources, then it is considered to be forbidden. Power must 
be drawn entirely from God, as only He can issue the law and it is from Him that all 
power is derived.
122
 
  
 Participation in a democratic society, however, can be divided clearly into two 
periods: before and after the 2011 Revolution and the existence of Salafi political parties. 
Before the Revolution, most Salafi preachers strongly forbade the participation in 
democracy. Abu Isḥāq al-Ḥuwainī stated in an interview with Al Furqān Magazine that 
politics was a government ploy to draw power away from Islamic movements and should 
be avoided. He also chastised the Muslim Brotherhood for their attempts to form 
democratic coalitions.
123
 Muḥammad Isma'īl al Muqaddim stated that although Islam 
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includes both the religion and the state,
124
 it also “refuses democracy entirely because it 
does not agree with our theology or culture”125 and that it turns the people into gods.126 
 
 Following the Revolution, a number of individuals such as Wagdy Ghuneim have 
continued to promote the concept that any participation in the political process is 
forbidden, and that the Salafis should focus on their religious message and ignore the 
draw of politics. In a recording, he stated that the creation of Salafi political parties, 
including Al Nour, marked the beginning of the end of the Salafi cause in Egypt. 
Continued political controversy and the willingness to alter their principles for political 
gain particularly in terms of a relationship with Israel would lead to the Salafis being 
rejected by the general population, weakening their position in the country and reducing 
their ability to call Muslims to the true version of Islam.
127
 Muḥammad Sa'īd Raslān also 
kept this position, calling all public uprisings part of a Masonic conspiracy to destroy the 
religion of Islam, with democracy as its method.
128
 
 
 However, most other members of the movement including those listed above such 
as Muḥammad Ḥassān129 and Muḥammad Isma'īl al Muqaddim 130 have changed their 
opinions entirely. They now state that participation in the Egyptian political system is 
required in order for the Salafis to reach their goals and many have become advocates of 
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the Salafi party al Nour.
131
 While this is a clear attempt to take advantage of the now open 
political system and utilize religion for political goals, the Salafis who changed their 
opinions argue that this was because in the past there was no benefit to participation as 
the results were predetermined. Now, they argue, this has changed and therefore they are 
required to participate. The Majlis Shūrá al Ulamā’ in its first official statement 
encouraged Egyptians to vote in favor of the constitutional amendments, and that there is 
no religious prohibition to vote in the elections of the People's Assembly, Consultative 
Assembly, or the Presidency.
132
 
 
 The same division and change of opinions can be seen in rulings regarding 
political protests, with most preachers condemning the practice before the Revolution 
only to change after the events became clear that the Salafis stood to gain politically. 
They even held their own protests in Tahrir Square on July 29
th
, 2011, bringing thousands 
of supporters from around the country to call for the immediate application of Islamic 
Law and reject calls to alter the Islamic nature of the state.
133
 
 
 This oscilating position on democracy and participation in the political process 
has resulted in a large conflict both within the Salafi movement as well as with the rest of 
Egyptian society. 'Abd al-Mun'eim al Shaḥḥāt for example was defeated in the 2011-2012 
parliamentary elections mainly due to his negative comments on democracy and protests 
made days before the election.
134
 
 
 The pictures that Salafis paint of an ideal Islamic in general is one of a theocracy, 
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ruled by the Imam or Khalīfa. This Khalīfa's characteristics and duties are entirely from a 
classical viewpoint, ignoring modern definitions of the state: he must be Muslim, male, 
just, knowledgeable, strong of opinion, with strong character traits, and from the Quraish 
tribe.
135
 He is responsible for protecting the religion, removing innovation and oppressing 
innovators, preparing the army, protecting the borders, upholding moral standards.
136
 The 
methods of selection of this Khalīfa could be through direct appointment, a coup d'état, or 
through a selection committee made of the brightest and most religious members of 
society.
137
  
 
 Opposition to this Imam is not allowed unless he issues a law that clearly violates 
the rules of Islam. The method of this opposition takes the form of “advice,” which 
ironically is described as obeying the ruler further by praying behind him and 
accompanying him in war, in the hopes that increasing good deeds around the leader will 
encourage him to return to the correct path of God.
138
 
 
Application of Shari'a and Islamic Law 
 The application of Islamic Law or Shari’a is considered one of the main goals and 
is the main driving factor for their entry and participation in politics. In speeches given at 
electoral conferences, preachers such as Māzin al Sirsāwī139 and Hazīm Shūmān140 have 
claimed that the only way that Egypt and the Muslim world will succeed is if the Shari’a 
is immediately applied. Despite this wide support, there are very few specifics given as to 
what this law actually consists of or how it is to be applied, representing one of the 
weakest points of Salafi discourse. The most probable reason for this lack of definition is 
the fact that most speakers in the movement have no formal educational experience in the 
                                                 
135 ‘Ādel ibn Yūssef al 'Azāzī, Muḥammad Ṣafwat Nour al Dīn and Abu Ishāq al Ḥuwainī, Tamām al 
Minna fi Fiqh al Kitāb wa Ṣaḥīḥ al Sunna (Fayoum, Egypt: Dar Subul al Salam, 2011) 4, 563 – 565. 
136 Ibid., 4, 568 - 69. 
137 Ibid., 4, 560 - 563. 
138 Ibid., 4, 565 – 568. 
139 “Al Azhar wa Mawqifuhu min Taṭbiq al Shari’a,” YouTube video, 43:50, from Al Nas satellite channel, 
posted by “m4islam1.” 18 Apr 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dT-E0WezD9M.  
140 “Hazim Shoumān Ṭawq al Najā al Waḥīd Huwa Taṭbīq al Shari’a al Islamiyya,” YouTube video, 7:16, 
from Al Nour electoral conference, posted by “Yawm7News.” 26 Dec 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4l41GD2Wu4.  
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fields of law, and that their avoidance of politics meant remaining limited to issues of 
worship. Many audiences who are keen to listen to their speeches are also not prepared 
for complicated legal discussions in areas such as torts and rather prefer to hear powerful 
sermons that deal with more abstract religious issues. 
 
The only area of the Shari’a that receives extensive discussion from preachers is 
the application of the ḥudūd or criminal punishments for murder, stealing, adultery, 
rebellion, public drunkenness, or apostacy. These punishments, which range from 
whipping to stoning, exile, execution, and public crucifixion have been the subject of 
countless Salafi discussions, and were one of the main electoral subjects discussed by 
Salafi candidate Abu Isma’īl.141 These statements are equally abstract, and presented 
almost as a cure-all for societal problems. 
 
When it comes to the current law available, Salafi preachers also tend to take an 
immediately negative stance. Abu Isḥāq al Ḥuwainī forbids entering law school, claiming 
that it was learning how to apply the law of man as opposed to that of God, and the only 
area of law that is acceptable is that of personal status.
142
 Preachers often also ignore 
efforts of modern Egyptian legal figures to create modern applications of Shari'a such as 
those of Makhlūf al Minyāwī143 and 'Abd al-Razzāq al Sanhūrī.144 Aḥmad al Naqīb once 
mentioned the efforts of Ṣūfi Abu Ṭālib145 as one of the most powerful attempts to 
introduce Islamic law into Egyptian law, however quickly stated that this movement was 
                                                 
141 “Rasūl Allah 'Allamana, Ḥalqa Raqm 13 – Taṭbiq al Shari'a,” YouTube video, 12:34, from an episode 
of The Prophet Taught Us on Al Nas satellite channel, posted by “HazemSalahTV.” 13 Aug 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4b9le9QlHyE.  
142 “Abu Ishāq al Ḥuwainī: Dukhūl Kuliyyat al Ḥuqūq Ḥarām,” YouTube video, 1:28, from private 
mosque lecture, posted by “MrAbkareeno.” 4 Nov 2010, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eDhHYBZYTIg.  
143 Makhlūf al Minyāwī (d. 1878) was an Egyptian religious scholar who was asked by Khedive Isma’īl to 
review from Malikite legal perspective Rifā’ al Ṭaṭawī’s translation of French law. 
144 'Abd al-Razzāq al Sanhūrī (1895 – 1971) was an Egyptian legal scholar who worked to modernize 
Egypt’s legal system, working with the committee that promulgated the country’s civil code in 1949. 
145 Ṣūfi Abu Ṭālib (1925 – 2008) was an Egyptian legal scholar and politican, who served as the Speaker 
of the People’s Assembly from 1978 to 1983. In cooperation with Al Azhar, he formed a committee to 
review Egypt’s legal system, proposing to integrate clear elements of Islamic law into the existing 
system. However, this panel was dissolved and the project was never completed.  
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squashed by the Sadat regime and provided no details as to what the project entailed.
146
 
 
A more detailed approach to the methodology used by Salafis in the application of 
Shari’a is given at the beginning of the fourth chapter on methodology in the section 
entitled “The Nature of Shari’a.” 
 
Islamic Economic System and Banking 
 The foundation of an Islamic economy according to the Salafi movement is the 
removal of the practice of ribā, or interest in banking practices. This is usually backed by 
quoting the Hadith of the Prophet Muḥammad on the issue which states: “Every loan that 
brings a benefit is ribā,” even though this Hadith was determined to be weak by Al 
Albānī.147 Once this riba is removed, the banking system can be determined by the Salafi 
movement to be Islamic. 
 
 Other economic problems can be solved through the application of traditional 
Islamic instruments such as the payment of required alms, with many Salafi preachers not 
elaborating on how such an economic system should function in detail. For example, Abu 
Ishāq al Ḥuwainī stated in an interview on Al Ḥikma satellite channel that to solve the 
Egyptian financial crisis the government should create a law forcing all Muslims to pay 
their mandatory charity or Zakāt and non-Muslims to pay a special poll tax or jizya. 
These collected funds, placed into a special account at an Islamic bank so as to avoid any 
form of ribā, would act as an alternative to loans from the international community, 
which should be avoided.
148
 
 
 Additionally, in response to threats from the United States government to cut-off 
direct military aid, Muḥammad Ḥassān suggested the establishment of a one trillion 
                                                 
146 “Taṭbīq al Shari’a,” private lecture by Aḥmad al Naqīb, 2010. 
147 Muḥammad Nāṣir al Dīn al Albānī, Da'if al Jami'a al Saghir wa Ziyadatuhu (Beirut: Al Maktab al 
Islami), 617, no 4244. 
148 Aziza Abu Bakr, “Al Sheikh Al Ḥuwainī, 'alá al Ḥukūma Sann Qānūn li Jibāyat al Zakāt.”Al Shabab 
Magazine, 21 May 2011. 
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Egyptian Pound fund to collect donations that would replace US aid. This fund, although 
heavily criticized by economists and politicians from across the political spectrum was 
vocally supported by the Sheikh of Al Azhar
149
 and the head of the Sufi orders in 
Egypt.
150
 After a short period of media dialogue, the issue of the fund has gone silent and 
the funds gathered have gone unused. Both of these examples show the lack of economic 
ideas available from the Salafi movement, and that beyond traditional Islamic concepts of 
funding they have no alternative vision. 
 
 Beyond financial practices members of the Salafi movement also wish to curb 
other businesses that they see as a threat to their vision of morality. Alcohol sellers, 
nightclubs, and butchers who sell pork are all considered by the Salafi movement to be 
corruptors of the society, and that these practices must be banned in their entirety for the 
Islamic economy to be complete. 
 
 Since the 2011 Revolution, a number of liberal media outlets have pointed-out the 
Salafi opposition to foreign tourists visiting the country's beaches. Their bikinis caused a 
moral crisis for Egyptians and disrupted society as a whole. The solutions provided to 
this have ranged from a requirement for all women in the country, including visitors and 
non-Muslims, to abide to an Islamic dress code or simply the creation of special beaches 
that allow for conservative families to visit. Liberal commentators claimed that this view 
would have a detrimental effect on the country's billion-dollar tourism industry. Salafi 
preacher Yāssir Burhāmī responded to these claims stating that foreign tourism could be 
replaced with Islamic tourism, citing Turkey as a successful example.
151
 Salafi 
presidential candidate Hāzim Ṣalāḥ Abu Isma'īl has also expressed similar claims as part 
of his campaign.
152
 Both figures, however, do not define how tourism should be changed 
                                                 
149 Muḥammad 'Abd al-Khāliq, “Al Azhar Yatabanna Mubādarat 'La lil Ma'ūna al Amrikiyya'” Al Ahram, 
17 Feb 2012, First Page. 
150 Lu'ay Ali, “Al Sharif wa al Qasabī Yuṭliqān Ṣundūq al 'Izza bi Ra's Māl 1000 Millyār Junayh li Inqādh 
Iqtiṣād Misr,” Al Yawm Al Sabi', 16 February 2012.  
151 “Al Siyāḥa al Islamiyya fi Turkiyā,” YouTube video, 7:16, from an interview with Dream TV, posted 
by “tawphique.” 17 Sep 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2u6oHuukOvw. 
152 “Al Siyāḥa fi al Dawla al Islamiyya fi 'Ahd al Sheikh Hāzim Ṣalāḥ Abu Isma'īl,” YouTube video, 
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in detail, leaving the issue unclear.  
 
Women's Rights 
 The approach of Salafis to the issues of women in modern Egyptian society is 
largely one based around the concept of tribulation or fitna, and that women constitute the 
greatest tribulation in the world for men. Therefore, interaction with women should be 
avoided at all costs to reduce occurrence of this tribulation, leading to claims from 
preachers such as Muḥammad Ḥassān that all women who leave the house not wearing 
proper Islamic clothing are intentionally trying to destroy men.
153
 
 
 In terms of the workplace, the Salafi figures looked at in this study universally 
agree that the position of the woman is one of a homemaker, raising the children which 
will compose the future generations and therefore she is one of the most important 
foundations of the Islamic society. She should in general not work, and should only leave 
the home when she is escorted by a male member of the family, or a maḥram. Many 
Salafi preachers lament the position of women in modern society, considering their 
participation in the workforce as detrimental to future Muslims. Muḥammad Isma'īl al 
Muqaddim described this through the phenomenon of the “Children of the Keys,” or 
families where children must carry keys to school, as they will return to home alone until 
their parents return from work.
154
 
 
 However, some such as Muḥammad Ḥassān have taken a more nuanced stance 
and stated that a woman can work if it is a necessity for the family, and that arguably the 
high poverty rates in Egypt mean that most women need to work. However, this must be 
done within the limits of the Shari'a, meaning that she must be fully veiled and wear the 
                                                                                                                                                 
14:44, from the show Huna al 'Āsima on the CBC satellite channel, posted by “islamloveforever1.” 22 
Sep 2011,  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f_MlF_qlnCk. 
153 “Fitnat al Nisā' fi Ḥijāb al Ra's wa al Binṭāl al Dayyiq,” Youtube video, 3:17, from Al Rahma satellite 
channel, posted by “wesso12000.” 25 Sep 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BrBloxwyLyE. 
154 “Aṭfāl al Mafātīḥ!!! Al Duktūr Muḥammad Isma'īl al Muqaddim,” YouTube video, 4:19, from the Ana 
Salafy video library, posted by “0117290230.” 28 Dec 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fepw5qcCngw. 
54 
niqāb, and not interact with men.155 Hāzim Ṣalāḥ Abu Isma'īl in a television interview 
mentioned that a woman's life is divided into two periods: one during which she is busy 
with the job of raising her children, and the other when she is not busy. During both 
periods she has the freedom to work, however it must always be under the restrictions of 
the Shari'a.
156
 
 
 Some figures in the Salafi movement have even stretched the ban on female 
interaction in the society to its farthest limits, forbidding women from even attending 
Friday prayers in the mosque, which is traditionally required only of men. Abu Isḥāq Al 
Huwainī is one of the few preachers that allow women to go to the mosque on Friday for 
multiple reasons including that she is usually trapped in her own home and this is the 
only time that women can sit together without spreading rumors and talking about men 
behind their backs. This is necessary to renew their faith; otherwise they would fall into 
temptation.
157
 
 
 Another major women's rights issue that has been the focus of serious debate with 
the Salafi movement and the remainder of Egyptian society has been that of the full-face 
veil, or the niqāb. In 1990 Isma'īl Manṣūr, a professor at Cairo University published a 
work that argued for the forbidding of the niqāb in Islam, and that it is nothing more than 
a mere cultural icon that existed prior to the spread of the religion.
158
 This book and its 
subsequent re-publishings in 2005 and 2008 combined with a public scandal involving 
the former Sheikh of Al Ahzar Muḥammad Ṭanṭāwī insiting that a female elementary 
student remove the veil during a media tour to bring the issue to the religious forefront.
159
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 Salafis according to Mansour’s study have universally agreed that the niqāb is 
required under most circumstances, based almost entirely on the opinions of the schools 
of classical Islamic jurisprudence. Even in circumstances where jurists ruled that wearing 
the face veil was mustaḥab, or preferred but not required, they state that it would be 
better to stay on the safe side and wear it. These are the recorded opinions of Muḥammad 
Hussein Ya’qūb,160 Abu Isḥāq al Huwainī,161 and Muḥammad Ḥassān.162 Muḥammad 
Isma'īl al Muqaddim wrote a book whose introduction was written by none other than the 
Mufti of Saudi Arabia that violently attacked those who denounce the niqāb as well as the 
book stated above.
163
  
 
 Aside from these specifics, there are large areas of women’s rights that are rarely 
mentioned in the Salafi discourse including education, health, legal rights in marriage and 
divorce, and children’s rights. Abu Isḥāq al Ḥuwainī, however, once commented that 
ignorance is rampant amongst women and that no matter how much she studied, a 
woman would always remain ignorant because knowledge is for men and men alone.
164
 
Wagdy Ghuneim has also been banned from a number of countries due to his claim that 
female circumcision is a religious requirement.
165
 
 
Non-Muslims in the Islamic State 
 Salafis believe that all non-Muslims present in the state are Dhimmī, or 
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YouTube video, 2:02, from Al Nas satellite channel, posted by “mando695.” 9 Oct 2009, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gqT6tM411KI. 
161 “Hal al Niqāb Wājib am Mustaḥabb?” YouTube video, 7:40, from al Ḥuwainī's website, posted by 
“eslamelsherbiny.” 27 Oct 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=maz-Vwn3qkw&feature=fvst. 
162 “Ḥukm al Niqāb fi al Islām,” YouTube video, 10:13, from Al Rahma satellite channel, posted by 
“1981musta.” 13 Oct 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TpHk3DHRQ2s. 
163 Muḥammad Isma'īl al Muqaddim, Dafa' al Ṣā'il 'alá Mashrū'iyyat al Ḥijāb al Kāmil (Alexandria, 
Egypt: Dār al Khulifā' al Rāshiden, 2009) 245 – 247. 
164 “Abu Ishāq al Ḥuwainī Yasubb al Nisā’ Jami’an,” YouTube Video, 1:27, from Al Nas satellite channel, 
posted by “kshaaf2.” 3 Jun 2011 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w65CZFVPRSg. 
165 “Ḥukūmat Tunis al Islamiyya Raddan ‘ala Ghuneim: Khitān al Ināth Laysa min Thaqāfatina,” Al 
Shorouk News, 16 Feb 2012, Nass wa Ḥayāt section. 
56 
individuals under the protection of Islam.
166
 Their position as citizens is questionable, as 
Salafis do not affirm the modern concept of citizenship, as this is not mentioned in the 
original texts of Islam. This idea was introduced to the country’s constitution as part of a 
conspiracy by the regime to destroy the Islamic nature of the state.
167
  In return for their 
stay in the country, many Salafi preachers believe in the application of the Jizya, or the 
poll tax prescribed in the Qur’ān168 however abolished in Egypt under the reign of Sa'īd 
Pasha in 1855.
169
  
 
To affirm this separation, Salafi preachers such as Yāssir Burhāmī,170 Aḥmad al 
Naqīb,171 and Muṣṭafa al-‘Adawī172 have all stated that it is forbidden for a Christian to 
hold the office of President because they have no position in overseeing the affairs of 
Muslims. They are simply neighbors that should be respected as long as they continue to 
respect Muslims. These same speakers all agree, however, that Christian and other non-
Muslims in the country have the right to their own personal status laws, stating that they 
may be separate but equal. 
 
 Direct personal relationships between Muslims and Christians in Egypt are 
defined by Salafis through the traditional concept of walā' and barā', considered by 
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167 “Muḥammad Isma’īl al Muqaddim wa al Muwāṭana,” YouTube video, 1:40, from Ana Salafy website, 
posted by “montiman1972.” 22 Jul 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g6Youf_J7T4. 
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Nahar satellite channel, posted by “amrmagdy2008.” 10 Dec 2011, 
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171 “Hal Mumkin Messiḥī Yabqa Ra’is Misr? Wa Shahid Radd al Sheikh Aḥmad al Naqib,” YouTube 
video, 2:46, from al Basira online channel, posted by “7910bebo.” 17 Feb 2012, 
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individuals such as Muḥammad Ḥassān to be one of the primary foundations of Islam.173 
Muslims are not allowed to celebrate any festivals that have non-Islamic undertones such 
as Easter and Christmas, nor congratulate non-Muslims on the occasion. They also may 
not support or participate in any official religious activities of non-Muslims, such as 
going to Church. For example, many Salafi preachers condemned the Mufti of Egypt Ali 
Goma' for his attendance of Coptic events but said nothing when Hāzim Ṣalāḥ Abu 
Isma'īl attended the funeral of Coptic Pope Shenouda.174 
 
 Many preachers feel that there also must be a clear visual difference between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. This can be seen in the Salafi attachment to the requirement 
that Muslim men grow out their beards and trim their mustaches. This is due to the fact 
that, in their opinion, by shaving your beard you are making yourself to look like non-
Muslims, and there must be something to differentiate yourself and others in the society 
to avoid being cursed by God for associating yourself with those going to hell.
175
 Abu 
Isḥāq al Huwainī compared growing the beard to a national flag, and stated that those 
who shave their beards could easily be confused with a homosexual. In the same 
presentation, he also states that those who reject the requirement of growing a beard have 
left the religion of Islam.
176
 
 
 Even the question of loving Christians as a fellow Egyptian became a main issue 
in modern debates, when on one major satellite program a Salafi guest and caller claimed 
that he will respect Christians; however he cannot love them as they differ in their 
theology. This resulted in calls from Sufi preacher al-Ḥabīb 'Ali al-Jafrī rejecting the 
concept and stating that if God allowed Muslim men to marry Christian and Jewish 
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women, then how could this be done without love? The following Friday, Abu Isḥāq al 
Huwainī clearly rejected the concept again, stating that there is no love for non-Muslims 
in Islam.
177
 In a public lecture, Muḥammad Sa'īd Raslān claimed that all those who love 
non-Muslims have left the religion.
178
 
 
 A prime example of this distrust and tension between the Salafis and Christians 
would be in the issue of the conversion of Christian women. In 2008 Wafā’ Constantine, 
the wife of a preacher in the Buhaira governate, reportedly converted to Islam and fled 
her husband. She then was taken back into the custody of the Coptic Church and has not 
been seen in public since.
179
 A similar chain of events occurred in 2010 with public 
school teacher Camilia Sheḥata.180 Salafis have reacted to these events in various ways by 
establishing civil society groups and holding protests. In May of 2011 in the aftermath of 
the Revolution in the neighborhood in Imbaba this tension boiled over into violence, 
where Salafis attacked a church that was reportedly holding converted Christian 'Abīr 
Fakhrī. The resulting conflict ended with more than 15 deaths and 242 injuries, along 
with the burning of two churches and their attached community service buildings.
181
  
 
Position of Al Azhar 
 Most Salafi preachers see the country's official religious institution, Al Azhar, as 
one of the most important of its kind in the world, and as the primary educational source 
for Muslims around the world.
182
 The imagery of Al Azhar from within the Salafi 
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movement is however notably abstract; as a citadel of knowledge and the subject of 
pouring ovations.
183
 Muḥammad Ḥassān, for example, sought approval from the Sheikh 
of Al Azhar Aḥmad Al Ṭayyib before continuing with his campaign to replace US aid 
with donations. Many written works by Salafis have also sought official approval from Al 
Azhar before publishing, proudly displaying the certificates and stating on the cover that 
they are accepted by their panels.
184
 This acts primarily as a form of legitimacy for their 
works, and guarantees them a larger audience.  
 
The attachment to Al Azhar for reasons of legitimacy is what has driven many in 
the movement such as Muḥammad Ḥassān to seek degrees from the institution. As was 
mentioned in Chpater 2, Māzin Sirsāwī, Muḥammad al Ṣaghīr, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 
and others proudly display their Azhari qualifications, with some refusing to appear in 
public without wearing their official uniforms.  
 
 However, although expressing an intense respect for the institution and place of Al 
Azhar in the Muslim World, the Salafis strongly attack many of the professors associated 
with the institution and have repeatedly called for their removal.
185
 Muḥammad 'Abd al- 
Maqṣūd, for example, attacked al Tayyib's statement that the Salafis are the Kharijites of 
this age by stating that his appointment at Al Azhar was a mistake, due to the fact that he 
was a philosophy and theology major. According to him, the Sheikh of Al Azhar should 
only be someone well versed in jurisprudence.
186
 The Grand Mufti ‘Ali Juma’ has also 
seen his fair share of attacks from the Salafis, with criticism focused mainly at his 
contradictory rulings, accusing him of radically changing his opinions upon his 
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=npmzfnf_xSU.  
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appointment to the position.
187
  
 
 Salafis also advocate heavily for the reform of Al Azhar, claiming that it had 
become part of the corrupt political regime and as a result of the Revolution should be 
cleansed. This should be done through financial independence and the introduction of a 
curriculum that more solidly integrates the Qur'ān and Sunna, avoiding the innovations of 
other Muslim groups particularly the Sufis and Shi'a.
188
 Despite these criticisms, 
preachers such as al Huwainī have consistently ruled that an education at Al Azhar is still 
religiously permissible and represents the best hope for students to understand their 
religion and memorize the Qur’ān in a non-offensive setting, although the weak 
curriculum must be reinforced with outside lessons.
189
  
 
Approach to the Shi'a 
 Although Egypt reportedly has a small Shia population, which is less than one 
percent of the total Muslim population,
190
 the influence of the Shi'a tends to draw some of 
the most powerful attention from the Salafi movement. Aḥmad al Naqīb has stated in 
public lectures that all forms of bid’a that exist in the country today have been brought by 
the Shi'a. Ibrahim Fawzi and Yāssīr Burhāmī have written a pamphlet comparing the 
Foundations of Jurisprudence between the Sunna and Shi'a sects, attacking the position of 
the Shi'a for their criticism of the Companions.
191
 
 
 In Ramadan of 2011, the Al Nas satellite channel ran a program entitled “Our 
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Public Life, October 2009, 8-11. 
191 Ibrahim Fawzi, Usūl al Shi'a bayn Ahl al Sunna wa al Shi'a (Alexandria, Egypt: Dar al 'Aqeeda, 2003). 
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Theology...A Red Line” which brought on a number of Salafi preachers to attack the 
Shi'a. The stated goal of the program according to the introduction provided by the 
announcer on the first episode was to “call the Shi'a to the true religion of God, and to 
prevent Shi'a influence from spreading in Egyptian society.”192 Each of the following 
thirty episodes of the program were divided into subjects with such titles as “The Prophet 
between the Greatness of the Sunna and the Attacks of the Shi'a,” “The Companions 
between the Respect of the Sunna and the Attacks of the Shi'a,” and “The Mut'a Marriage 
with the Shi'a.” 
 
 Salafi preacher Sa'īd ‘Abd al-'Adhīm, who was the guest of the first episode, 
stated clearly that due to this negative position any reconciliation between the two sects 
according to the Salafi movement is obviously not possible. This is not due to a lack of 
compassion or effort from either side, but because there is a fundamental disagreement on 
theology, with some Salafis calling the Shi'a innovators. The only way to build a 
relationship with the Shi'a is if they abandon their beliefs.
193
 
 
 This radical position towards the Shi'a also has a direct effect on the Salafi 
approach to foreign relations. Islamist academic Muḥammad Selim al 'Awwa in his 
election campaign has called for a normalization of relations between Egypt and Iran, 
stating that Iran is a regional power that should be communicated with openly. This 
should also be done within the context of a greater reconciliation between the two 
sects.
194
 The Iranian government has also responded positively to these calls, asking to 
place a permanent ambassador in Cairo and allow bilateral relations to grow.
195
 The 
Salafis have universally rejected this effort, and also used their media outlets to attack al 
'Awwa's position on this matter and claim that this alone makes him unsuitable for the 
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office of the presidency.
196
 
 
Arts and Leisure 
 Art according to Salafi preachers is a method, or wasīla, of expression and 
therefore is itself considered to be generally allowed or Mubāḥ. It is the works of 
individuals, however, that then make art acceptable or not in Islamic terms. Acceptable 
art is that which is purely religious in nature, and deals exclusively with the glorification 
of God or acts of worship. To some, even preaching to groups is considered an art form, 
with a number of television shows dedicated to describing the qualities and requisites of a 
good preacher,
197
 as well as exhibitions of children as young as seven years old loudly 
presenting traditional speeches.
198
 
 
 Beyond the realm of religion, however, art and acts of leisure become almost 
exclusively forbidden. This typically falls under a much wider discussion of Lahw, or 
having fun, which is not allowed. Anything that detracts from acts of worship such as 
delaying prayers or wastes time is in general forbidden. Specifically this can include 
activities as simple as watching movies and television shows.
199
 
 
 The most vivid example of the prohibition of Lahw was the Salafi response to the 
massacre of more than 70 Egyptians who died in the violence between the supporters of 
two soccer teams after a match in the city of Port Said.
200
 While the rest of society called 
them “martyrs of the Revolution” and victims of violence perpetrated by former members 
of the Mubarak regime, preachers ‘Abd al-Mun'im al-Shaḥḥāt,201 Muḥammad Ḥussein 
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Ya’qūb,202 and Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Maqsūd203 claimed that they had died in vain 
watching a forbidden sport, and that by overwhelmingly supporting football teams they 
were actually practicing a form of hidden shirk, loving football in the place of God. Some 
Salafi preachers such as Aḥmad al Naqīb204 and Wagdy Ghuneim205 were astonished by 
these remarks, and condemned the other preachers for causing tribulation and instability 
in the society. 
 
 Beyond Lahw, individual acts of art and leisure are specifically forbidden because 
they show-off or spread immoral practices, particularly those related to women such as 
sexual relationships, the appearance of a woman not wearing a full veil, or simply the 
presence of men and women in one location at the same time.
206
 Clear examples of this 
can be found in the Salafi position on literature. Some of the country's most popular 
modern authors have come under direct attack by Salafi preachers, particularly those who 
were popular for their depictions of life in the city's poorest areas or described scenes of 
sexual intimacy. Classical writers Naguib Maḥfūz, Anīs Manṣūr, Ṭaha Ḥussein, and 
modern novelist Alā' al Aswānī for example have all been objects of serious 
condemnation by preachers such as ‘Abd al-Mun'eim al Shaḥḥat,207 Yāssir Burhāmī,208 
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Abu Isḥāq al Huwainī,209 Muḥammad Isma'īl al Muqaddim,210 and others. 
 
 However, there has been very little discussion within the Salafi movement as to 
what extent these opinions on the arts would affect domestic policy. What would be the 
legal consequences if an artist were to create a work of art considered forbidden by Salafi 
preachers? Are they simply to be condemned and Muslims called to reject it? Or should 
these works of art be banned in an act to protect society? 
 
 Beyond the legal opinions, there are Salafi preachers who have taken matters into 
their own hands, using the country's legal system to seek the banning of material deemed 
as inappropriate or calling for the imprisonment of anyone who defies their religious 
interpretation. This has led to lawsuits against the production of classic works of 
literature such as the Thousand and One Nights
 
.
211
 Adel Imam, one of the country's 
oldest actors, was sentenced to three months with hard work for insulting Islam's reported 
“official dress of the white robes and the face veil”,212 and even youth pop singer Tamer 
Hosny has seen the wrath of this legal movement, sued in court because he sang a song 
that could have negative religious interpretations.
213
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CHAPTER 4: 
Methodology 
 After understanding the historical development of the Salafi movement as well as 
viewing a selection of the opinions of the members of the movement, the following 
section seeks to derive the methodology of the Salafi movement and give a limited view 
on how they see the world around them. 
 
Ideological Influences 
 Many of the members of the Salafi movement through their biographies have 
shown to be influenced by a number of Egyptian and foreign thinkers and traditional 
writers. In the field of Fiqh or Jurisprudence, the work of Muslim Brotherhood member 
Sayyid Sābiq, Fiqh al Sunna, is widely mentioned in their biographies, with a number of 
Salafi writers completing explanatory works of Sābiq.214 This work produced by a non-
Salafi has nevertheless been mentioned by Salafi commentators as one of the primary 
texts explaining Islamic law, yet was designed specifically for individuals, using the 
simplest language possible. 
 
 Another major figure mentioned in the works of the Salafi writers is ‘Abd al-
Ḥamīd Kishk (1933 - 1996). A prominent religious scholar who was known for his large 
number of speeches and his populist, anti-government stances, Kishk figured prominently 
in the early lives of the Salafi scholars and Egyptian society as a whole. In the words of 
Gilles Kepel:  
 
 “In the last years of Sadat's presidency, it was impossible to walk the streets of 
 Cairo without  hearing his stentorian voice. Climb into a collective service-taxi 
 and the driver is listening to one of Sheikh Kishk's recorded sermons on his 
 cassette player. Stop for a fruit juice at a street-corner stand, and while the 
 palate savors mango or cane sugar, the ear is bombarded by the sermon 
 delivered by Sheikh Kishk the previous Friday...”215 
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 In the field of Hadith, the works of Muḥammad Nāṣir Al Dīn Al Albānī provide 
the boldest attraction and are cited the most throughout Salafi works and speeches. Al 
Albānī was born in 1914 in the village of Shkoder, currently in modern Albania. Due to 
political difficulties of the time, his father moved the family to Damascus. In his early 
life, Al Albānī took a keen interest in Hadith, and during his life wrote a number of works 
on the subject. He spent the majority of his later life in Jordan, with a brief appointment 
at the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia between 1961-63
216
 as well as a 
number of short visits to other countries in the region including Egypt, however only to 
conduct research at the Library of Alexandria.
217
 He passed away in 1999. 
 
 The importance of Al Albānī and his contribution to the Salafi understanding of 
Hadith cannot be understated in the least. Almost all of the Salafi written works relate 
their Hadiths to the catalogs of Al Albānī, with some such as Maḥmūd al Miṣrī relying 
exclusively on his rulings according to the soundness of a particular Hadith as well as its 
use in law.
218
 For example, the most important speaker who discusses the position of 
Hadith is Abu Isḥāq El Ḥuwainī. Described by his students as a renowned scholar of the 
Hadith sciences, one of his largest independent works is an anthology of praise for Al 
Albānī, defending him against critics in the fields of Hadith, Usūl, and Jurisprudence. He 
states in the introduction that he believes that Albānī is a living example of the Prophetic 
Sunna, and if this symbol is attacked, or even questioned, it is as though that person has 
attacked the Sunna itself.
219
 Others, such as Muḥammad Ḥassān, have expressed similar 
opinions in the praise of Albānī's position on Hadith.220 
 
 And finally, almost all Salafi preachers in Egypt were significantly influenced by 
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‘Abd al-'Azīz bin Bāz (1910 - 1999) and Muḥammad ibn Ṣalāḥ ibn 'Uthaymayn (1925 - 
2001), two of Saudi Arabia's largest modern religious figures, with many Salafi preachers 
taking the effort to list at least one of the two on their resumes, even if they had only 
attended one lesson and were not regular students. The relationship of Egyptian Salafis to 
these Saudi figures is not only one of a teacher influencing the thoughts of his students, 
but has developed to the point where legal issues expressed by Salafi preachers are 
simply direct applications of the Saudi opinion. 
 
Sources Used in Discussion 
 Upon approaching most works written by members of the Salafi movement, the 
average reader typically finds that the order of presentation is set as the following: first 
are the Qur’ānic verses relevant to the subject. Second a presentation of the necessary 
Hadiths, usually with the validating rulings provided by Al Albānī. Thirdly are statements 
of Sheikh al Islam Ibn Taymiyya or Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyya. Fourth are fatwas from 
Saudi scholars such as ‘Abd al-'Azīz bin Bāz or Muḥammad Ibn Ṣāliḥ ibn 'Uthaymayn. 
Fifth are any other opinions are provided that support their opinion, and then finally they 
will present their own interpretation.  
 
 This style of presentation can be found in the works of Maḥmūd al Miṣrī, a 
prolific writer with more than a hundred works. In his book Yawm fi al Janna, for 
example, he raises the question of the children of unbelievers and what their place will be 
in the afterlife. As this issue is not discussed in the Qur’ān he skips the first step and 
presents two Ḥadiths confirming that all children are born without sin and it is their 
parents that introduce them to other religions. To confirm these Hadiths, he directly 
quotes al-Bukhārī and Ibn Ḥajar’s analysis of these opinions and introduces a third 
Ḥadith in neither collection but declared sound by Al Albānī. Step three is then stating 
that this is the majority opinion, citing a fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya. Step four is left out and 
step five is placed by citing that this is also the opinion of al Qurṭūbī, without presenting 
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the quotation.
221
   
 
 This example of presentation shows the step-by-step process used in presenting 
opinions, and that at times these steps can be skipped. Ultimately, each step in this 
process is done without an analysis of the texts cited and usually consists of direct quotes, 
leaving them as they are without interpretation. 
 
Method of Presentation 
 To show an example of how Salafi members present in a modern argument, Abu 
Isḥāq al Ḥuwainī presented the ruling of cursing the Prophet on the Hikma satellite 
channel, in response to cartoons presented by businessman Najib Sawiris that showed 
Micky and Minnie Mouse with a long beard and niqāb. After a long line of personal 
attacks and insults and a statement that religious people never stand down from their 
strong moral principles, he states that cursing the Prophet removes one from the religion 
and is a crime punishable by death, even if the person apologizes. This is opposed to 
cursing God, because this curse does not hurt the Creator. A human being however, which 
the Prophet is, is hurt by these negative statements. The Prophet Muḥammad has the right 
to forgive those who cursed him, however this right ended upon his death. The burden 
then falls on the entire Muslim community and its ruler to carry out the right of the 
Prophet to retaliation. To back his argument, Al Ḥuwainī uses a story related by Abu 
Barza in the Hadith Collection of Musnad Aḥmad, leaving out any discussion of the 
validity of these statements and skipping through most of the Hadith. 
 
 Once he has established this basic principle upon which he leaves no room for 
argument, Al Ḥuwainī then begins to widen the circle of this ruling beyond its traditional 
context. He states that in a Hadith of Bukhārī narrated by Sayyed ibn Yazīd that the 
Caliph ‘Umar threatened to kill people who raised their voices in the Prophet's mosque in 
Medina, claiming that this was an application of the Qur’ānic verse that forbids raising 
the voices of the believers over the Prophet. Something this simple, he states, is 
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something that all Muslims should defend. Because beards and the niqāb are critical 
symbols of the Prophet's Tradition, any person who attacks them or those who wear them 
is directly attacking the Prophet. These statements effectively remove all criticism of the 
Salafi movement in general, as they are simply working to apply the traditions of the 
Prophet.
222
 
 
 Throughout the speech, he uses authoritative statements such as “every single 
scholar throughout Islamic history agrees on this issue, and no individual has ever 
questioned this,” as well as rhetorical questions including “Who would ever agree to this? 
This is a question that I have proposed and will answer: nobody.” Each of these 
statements is designed to limit the legitimacy of alternative opinions. 
 
 In another situation al Ḥuwainī gave a speech comparing the Muslim World to the 
United States, asking why is it that the Muslims have been unable to invade the US to this 
date. He claimed that it was not because of American strength, rather due to the extreme 
weakness of Muslims. The United States is home to a fake culture that commonly allows 
marriages between men and donkeys and goats, lets homosexuals run freely, and arrests 
any man who dares to hit his son as it is a violation of his personal rights. According to Al 
Ḥuwainī, Muslim weakness comes from the fact that one-third of the world Muslim 
population does not pray, gives charity, nor “promotes virtue and prevents vice.”223  
  
 As a result, while the accuracy of these references are and how they relevant they 
are to the opinions of the overall Salafi movement is questionable, it is clear that 
preachers are integrating them into their speeches for the explicit purpose of enhancing 
legitimacy. Salafis know that most of their audience will not take the effort to confirm or 
deny the details of their speeches, and that their information and awareness of most 
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foreign subjects is limited. Therefore, they maintain a simple approach, working to stifle 
opinion and render their interpretation as the only legitimate representation of Islam. 
 
 Their style is also always that of a preacher and not a participant of an academic 
discussion. Discussions by Salafis are almost always referred to quite literally as 
Khutbas, or sermons, with the first few minutes of even simple television interviews 
beginning with the citation of Qur’ānic verses, Hadiths, and other messages typically 
only heard from the pulpit and not in secular debates. 
 
Theology as the Core 
 Bid’a, as discussed by all of these writers and the proponents of modern Salafism, 
is also primarily an issue of belief and theology, known in Arabic as 'aqeeda. Legal 
issues, or fiqh, come secondary in most Salafi discussions. The explanation for this is that 
Salafis believe that the main reason for the collapse of the Muslim community is the 
introduction of bid’a. These innovations act as forms of corruption, rendering all actions 
of the Muslims invalid, resulting in a declining state of worldly affairs. This results in the 
focus of Salafis on issues that are of merely spiritual influence to Egyptian society, such 
as visiting Sufi saints at graves
224
 and dress codes, dramatically enhanced through their 
style of communication to become some of the most important issues facing the country.  
 
 At other times, the issues discussed by the Salafi movement are non-existent or 
far from applicable to modern Egyptian society. For example, in a work written by 
preacher Mahmoud al Masrī calling to attention the wrongs committed by Muslims every 
day during their prayers, amongst relevant issues such as yelling and begging in mosques, 
the author calls attention to planting trees in the mosque, men praying wearing gold 
jewelry, praying in the bathroom and the nesting places of camels.
225
 
 
 Additionally, there is a tendency in the Salafi movement to turn legal rulings into 
                                                 
224 Muḥammad Nāṣir al Dīn al Albānī, Tahdhīr al Sājid min Ittikhādh al Qubūr Masājid (Riyad: Maktabat 
al Ma'ārif, 2001). 
225 Maḥmūd al Miṣrī, Irshād al Sālikīn ilá Akhtā' al Muṣallīn (Cairo: Dar al Salaf al Ṣāliḥ, 2006) 10-30. 
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a choice between belief and disbelief. For example, Salafis strongly promote the 
shortening of pants and lengthening the beard for men and the wearing of the full-face 
veil for women. Many preachers defend these legal positions strongly, and when 
confronted with an alternative interpretation they refuse to accept it. Rather, they claim 
that shortening one's pants is a sign of faith, a symbol of the pure religion of Islam as it 
was presented to mankind by God and the Prophet Muḥammad. This was the stance taken 
by Abu Isḥāq al Ḥuwainī against the Mufti of Egypt ‘Ali Juma’, whose comments 
resulted in a lawsuit.
226
 
 
 It should also be noted that the legal issues chosen by Salafis also directly relate to 
popular stances at the time. For example, while presidential candidate Hāzim Ṣalāḥ Abu 
Isma'īl in his program offered to ban foreign tourists from wearing bikinis on the 
country's beaches because it was detrimental to the nation's morals, he failed to address 
issues such as smoking, an issue that affects more than 26% of the country's male 
population.
227
 Scholars from across the religious spectrum have issued rulings forbidding 
smoking, however it seems Abu Isma'īl is unwilling to approach the issue due to the 
direct impact that it would have on his own popularity and election chances. 
 
 The same can be said for bid’a and that the innovations that need to be cleansed 
are chosen specifically to avoid any direct conflict with the existent political, economic, 
or at times even cultural regime. Preachers, particularly before the Revolution, rarely 
pushed for the removal of the bid’a of the political or legal system, presumably because 
of their fear of imprisonment by state security. In issues that deal with culture such as the 
lawsuits against Tamer Hosnī and Adel Imām were also all raised after these figures had 
fallen from their peaks in popularity and could easily be attacked without causing much 
public uproar.  
 
Approaching the Qur’ān and Sunna: Selective Literalism 
                                                 
226 “Radd al Sheikh al Ḥuwainī 'alá al Mufti...” YouTube video, 16:21, from Al Hikma satellite channel, 
posted by “alhekmahchanneltv.” 7 Jul 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GpjrCeDdwGU.   
227 Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, World Health Organization, 2011. 
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 The Qur’ān is to the Salafis, as it is to all other Muslims, the literal unchanged 
word of God, handed down to the Prophet Muḥammad by the Angel Gabriel, and 
represents the foundational text for all followers of the religion. Throughout the centuries 
Muslims have practiced Quranic exegesis through a process known in Arabic as ta'wīl, 
deriving alternative meanings or comparing verses with one another to develop different 
rulings. Salafis, however, will completely reject this process as invalid, claiming that the 
only understanding of the verses is to comprehend the surface, linguistic interpretation. 
Any deviation from this form of interpretation constitutes an introduction of bid’a.  
 
 A famous example of this method of interpretation in Salafi theology is that of the 
“hand” of God. In the Qur’ān a reference is made to God's hand.228 Traditional scholars 
interpreted this word as figurative, more of a reference to the omnipotent and ever-
present ability of God. Salafis, however, completely reject this statement and argue that 
this refers to the actual, literal hand of God. They respond to attacks that this is in 
violation of fundamental practice, that God is indescribable and beyond human 
comprehension, by stating that the hand exists, but its characteristics remain unknown.
229
 
 
 A legal application of this approach to the rejection of interpretation of Qur’ānic 
verses is that of the position of women in society. As was discussed in Chapter 3, all 
Salafi opinions viewed for the purposes of this study cited that women are required to 
stay in their homes and that they should only leave in the case of necessity. This opinion 
is typically justified according to Salafis by a clear Qur'ānic verse.230 This thereby 
negates women from participating in issues of politics and taking public office, as it 
                                                 
228 Qur'ān 48:10: “Verily those who plight their fealty to thee do no less than plight their fealty to God. 
The Hand of God is over their hands; then any one who violates his oath, does so to the harm of his own 
soul, and any one who fulfills what he has covenanted with God, God will soon grant him a great 
Reward.” Translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. 
 {إَّ ن ََّنيِذ لٱ َََّكنو  ِعيَاب ي اَم ِنإ ََّنو ِعيَاب ي ََّ  للّٱ ََّيَّ د َِّ  للّٱ ََّقَْوف َّْمِهيِدَْيأ نََمف ََّثَك ن َّ ِنَإفاَم َّ ث كَني َََّٰىلَع ِۦهِسَْفن َّْنَمَو ََّأَََّٰىفْو اَِمب َََّده ََٰع َّ هَْيلَع ََّ  للّٱ 
َِّهِيتْؤ يََسف اًرَْجأ ا ًًۭميِظَع}  
229 “Al Raḥmān 'alá al 'Arsh Istawá,” YouTube video, 9:32, from Al Rahma satellite channel, posted by 
“mohajery.” 6 Nov 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EwjiIJUiFFk&feature=related.  
230 Qur’ān 33: “And stay quietly in your houses, and make not a dazzling display, like that of the former 
Times of Ignorance....” Translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. 
 {ََّو ََّنَْرق ِىف َّ ن ِكتو ي ب ََّلاَو ََّنْج  َرَبت َّ َرَبتََّج َِّة ِيلِه ََٰجْلٱ ََّٰىَلو ْلأٱ} 
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would require them to leave the home and be visible to the public, which to Salafis is 
interpreted as a direct example of tabarruj in the cited verse. For example, in the mixed 
public gatherings in Tahrir Square in celebration of the one year anniversary of the 
January 25
th
 2011 Revolution, Salafi preacher Ayman Ṣaydaḥ remarked during live 
coverage of the events that what he saw angered him, and that “women should only leave 
the house and participate in protests only when there are no more men.”231 
  
 Although there is a general call to reject ta’wīl, there are a number of situations in 
which Salafis contradict their methodology and accept opinions based upon the 
interpretation of source texts. In the area of criminal punishments, for example, there is 
the traditional punishment of death for the crime of Ridda, translated as apostasy or the 
conversion of a Muslim to a religion other than Islam. Modern thinkers such as ‘Ali 
Juma’232 as well as Islamist presidential candidate ‘Abd al-Mun’eim Abu al Futūḥ233 have 
stated that this ruling is baseless, and that there are two clear Qur’ānic verses that 
override this ruling,
234
 stating that there is no compulsion in religion and that those who 
wish to believe or disbelieve have that right. This ruling according to Juma’ and Abu al 
Futūḥ was only devised by jurists in response to pressing political circumstances, and was 
almost never applied during the time of the Salaf. In the modern state situation, this 
would be equivalent to the crime of high treason, and not a violation of religious belief.  
 
However, in the view of Salafi preachers such as Abu Isḥāq al Ḥuwainī,235 
                                                 
231 “Special Coverage of the Anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution,” Al Rahma Staellite Chanel, 
broadcast 25 Jan 2012. 
232 ‘Ali Juma’ “Al Rissāla,” Attachment to Al Medina Newspaper, 27 Jul 2007.  
233 “’Abd al-Mun’eim Abū al Futūḥ Yalghi Ḥadd al Ridda,” YouTube video, 3:21, from an episode of 
10pm on Dream satellite channel, posted by “muhammedsaeed12.” 14 Mar 2012, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jM-GskHBbaQ.  
234 Qur’ān 2:256, “Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error…” Translated 
by ‘Abdullah Yusuf ‘Ali and 
“ََّهاَرِْكإَلا ِىف َِّني ِّدلٱ َدق ََّن َيب ت َّ دْش  رلٱ ََّنِم َِّّىَغْلٱ” 
     Qur’ān 18:29, “Say the Truth is from your Lord: Let him who will believe and let him who will reject 
(it)…” Translation by ‘Abdullah Yusuf ‘Ali 
“و َِّل ق َّ قَحْلٱ نِم َّْم  كِّب  ر نََمف ََّٓءاَش نِمْؤ يَْلف نَمَو ََّٓءاَش َّْر فَْكيَْلف “ 
235 “Ḥadd al Ridda,” YouTube video, 4:02, from mosque lecture, posted by “muslimscoptics.” 11 May 
2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LvIgAOnLvYI.  
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Muḥammad Ḥassān,236 and Aḥmad al Naqīb,237 the punishment for apostasy is a 
fundamental punishment given to Muslims by God Himself and that these thinkers are 
ignoring a clearly determined ruling in Islam. Ḥuwainī argues that whoever is explaining 
these verses in the way of Juma’ or Abu Futūḥ is someone who smokes drugs (ḥashīsh) 
and the verses that reject compulsion and encourage the freedom of religious thought are 
subject to extensive interpretation, actually referring to the relationship between Muslims 
and non-Muslims. People have the full right to move between other religions as they are 
all false. However, once they have made the decision to enter Islam, this ruling is then 
changed and compulsion is allowed in the form of forced prayer, dress, etc. and that those 
who leave the religion should be hunted down and killed for disobeying God. Ḥassān 
attempts to present Abu Al Futūḥ’s take as well, that all Muslims are part of one “nation” 
and by leaving that nation they have committed high treason. Al Naqīb, on the other 
hand, bypasses the Qur’ānic verses and moves directly to a Ḥadith from Muslim stating 
that all those who leave the religion should be killed, and that Abu Bakr fought lots of 
“very large wars” against those who had left the religion. 
 
 The second source of legislation, in agreement with all other Muslims, is the 
Hadith or Sunna, meaning more specifically the sayings, actions, and decisions made by 
the Prophet Muḥammad. However, Salafis will elevate the status of the Hadith in 
accordance with their primary influence in this field, Muḥammad Nāṣir al Dīn Al Albānī. 
They will consider Hadith at times to be more important than the Qur'ān, particularly in 
the understanding of their law. Their argument for this status of the Hadith is the fact that 
the Qur'ān was brought by the Prophet Muḥammad, and that it is only through his 
interpretation and practical application that the concepts of the Qur'ān can be understood, 
particularly the way that the law or shari'a should be applied.  
 
                                                 
236 “Qatl al Murtadd Muḥammad Ḥassān,” YouTube video, 3:04, from Al Nas satellite channel, posted by 
“zzzzilzalzzz.” 24 Mar 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ryXG9Mt4usI&feature=related.   
237 “D. Aḥmad al Naqīb Yarudd ‘alá man Ankara Ḥadd al Ridda,” YouTube video, 2:18, from Al Basīra 
website, posted by “ahmedabuganna.” 31 May 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIUqnZriMMs.  
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 In classical Hadith studies, a particular statement attached to the Prophet could be 
assigned a wide spectrum of different rulings based upon its correctness. For example, a 
relatively strong Hadith could be stated as Good (Ḥasan) or Sound (Ṣaḥīḥ). Muslim legal 
scholars frequently based opinions on weak Hadiths, citing the nuances and relationships 
the text of the Hadiths had with the law. Salafis, on the other hand, simplify this 
approach. Although specific works in the field such as those of al Albānī will mention 
these different classifications, from a legal perspective Hadiths are treated as either sound 
or weak.   
 
 Legally, once a Hadith has been determined as sound, it immediately becomes a 
requirement upon the entire Muslim population to apply and any individual who, of his 
own free will, decides to ignore the application of this Hadith opens himself to questions 
of faith. This determination of soundness is typically by the chain of narrators (Isnād) 
with little criticism of the content (Matn). In certain circumstances, this concept can also 
been applied in reverse. For example, in a collection of al Albānī’s rulings, he rejects the 
validity of the Hadith “If you see Mu'āwiya on my podium then kill him” not based upon 
its chain of narrators, but rather because it was not applied by the person who heard it nor 
the Muslim population at the time.
238
 
 
 Alternatively, Salafis will also strongly reject the use of weak Hadiths, or those 
that contain issues of question amongst scholars in the reliability of their narrators. One 
of the primary Salafi arguments is that the spread of incorrect practices and bid’a comes 
from the loose acceptance of weak Hadiths, for what they will argue were personal 
reasons (hawá) or to promote a particular group of Muslims throughout history. This 
strong rejection of weak Hadith will lead to one of the highest levels of debate between 
the Salafi movement and other members of the Egyptian Muslim community. In a 
number of printed Salafi works, the positions of scholars from Azhar are attacked because 
                                                 
238 Hādi ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar, Al Fawā'id al Majmū'a min Aḥadīth al Ṣaḥīḥa wa al Ḍa'ifa wa al 
Mawdū'a (Cairo: Dār al Rawḍa, 2008) 3, 42. 
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they use weak Hadiths.
239
 
 
 Salafis add an additional requirement that in order for a particular Hadith to be 
valid for use it must be considered to be sound, or “Ṣaḥīḥ,” particularly in terms of its 
chain of narrators or isnād. Once this chain has been determined to be sound, however, 
the contents or matn of the Hadith are immediately accepted as valid. Logically, the 
Salafis argue, if the chain of narrators is correct, then how could the contents of the 
Ḥadith have any level of doubt? 
 
 It is also important to note the Salafi lack of a framework when approaching both 
the Qur'ān and Sunna such as that established by scholars of Usūl al Fiqh. The literal 
statements of these texts are considered universal in and of themselves, and not simply 
the general values and principles that they promote. An example of this aspect of the 
Salafi methodology appeared in an argument presented by Muḥammad al Ghazālī. Salafi 
preachers once took the Hadith confirmed by Al Albānī: "Take the milk of the cow, for it 
is healing, and the fat of it is a cure, and the meat of it is diseased"
240
 literally, openly 
preaching to their followers that the eating of beef is forbidden. Al Ghazālī attacked this 
position, stating that there are numerous occasions in the Qur'ān, throughout the Prophet's 
life, and in traditional Islamic law where this type of meat was completely allowed. The 
Salafis, in the argument of al Ghazālī, were ignoring the context of the Hadith, taking one 
statement of the Prophet as the primary basis for a religious ruling without understanding 
any surrounding circumstances. 
 
 In another example, Salafi preachers tend to agree that photography in general is 
considered forbidden, however there are certain circumstances in which it is allowed, 
particularly live television broadcasts. Their evidence for this is a number of Prophetic 
                                                 
239 Ṭalḥa Muḥammad al Musayir, Al Duktūr 'Ali Juma'...Ilá Ayn? (Cairo: Al 'Alam Printing, 2011) 48 – 53. 
240 Muḥammad Naṣr al Dīn al Albānī, Ṣaḥīḥ al Jāmi'a al Saghīr wa Ziyādatuhu (Beirut: Al Maktab al 
Islāmī, 1988) 750, Hadith 4061. 
"ءاد اهمحلو ،ءاود اهنمسو ،ءافش اهنإف ،رقبلا نابلأب مكيلع" 
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statements rejecting the practice
241
. However, the word for photographers in Arabic, al 
Muṣawwirūn, when understood in its linguistic context, means simply “image makers,” 
and refers to those who build idols, creating an image of God. Some Salafis ignore this 
linguistic context, and use it as the basis for their attacks on not only photography but 
also a number of fine arts including sculpture. Only those who have reached their fame 
through appearances on television such as Muḥammad Ḥassān have declared that the 
ruling is different.
242
 
 
The Nature of Shari'a 
 As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the primary focus of the Salafi 
movement in Egypt is on issues of theology and rituals, but legal concerns are secondary. 
Nonetheless, the members of the movement have expressed their opinions regarding the 
position of Sharia, although in an extremely abstract and absolute manner. Islamic law or 
shari'a represents to the Salafis the pure Law of God that has remained entirely 
unchanged since its original presentation to the Prophet Muḥammad. New issues that 
have appeared in the world simply require a deeper understanding of the source texts, 
which will reveal the new ruling. 
 
 The only way that any society can reach its full potential is through the 
application of shari'a and, particularly in the case of Egypt, there will continue to be 
failures in the administration of the state until shari'a is fully applied. It is the ultimate 
representation of justice and that once it is applied all criminals will immediately be 
easily dealt with. There are no attorneys or representatives in the Salafi presentation of 
Shari'a, as the job of an attorney is seen as doubtful because he typically represents those 
who are unjust and is driven to seek out rights, which he and his client are not allowed.
243
  
                                                 
241 Al Bukhārī, Vol 7, P 167, Book al Libās, Chapter 'Adhāb al Muṣawirrīn Yawm al Qiyāma, and 
 Muslim Vol 3, P 1670, Hadith 98, Book al Libas wa al Zīna, Chapter Taḥrim Taṣwīr Ṣūrat al Ḥaywān 
242 “Ḥukm al Taṣwīr fi al Islām lil Sheikh Muḥammad Ḥassān,” YouTube video, 7:09, from Al Rahma 
satellite channel, posted by “m3nani.” 30 May 2010, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_w4TT4VP1Gk.  
243 “Ḥukm al Muḥamā fi al Islam – al Sheikh 'Abd al-'Azīz bin Bāz,” YouTube video, 3:31, from 
recording, posted by “heya0hay.” 21 Mar 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x_ReJjW0f_c.  
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The application of Islamic law according to the Salafi movement is based on three 
general steps. The first is the system of enforcement, which is that a criminal is brought 
forth by the people or representatives of the law, known as the muḥtasib or the Hay'at al 
Amr bil Ma'rūf wa al Nahy 'an al Munkar. In most circumstances, it appears that they 
believe that most individuals who appear in front of the court have been caught in the 
midst of a criminal act, and there is little need to prove guilt.  
 
 The second step is the bringing of evidence, known in Arabic as the Iqāmat al 
Ḥujaj, a simple process of registration and presentation of the condemning evidence, 
which cannot be argued against or denied. This evidence is usually mentioned as being 
more than enough to proceed with the sentencing and consists of two things: witnesses or 
a confession.
244
 Interestingly enough one of the main scholars drawn upon by the Salafi 
movement, Ibn Al Qayyim, lists in detail a number of additional ways to prove a crime,
245
 
something completely ignored by Salafis in their discussions on the application of 
Shari’a. 
 
 All legal systems created by humans, or what is referred to as waḍ'ī are seen as 
entirely corrupt, and no matter how advanced it may become or how just it may appear to 
be, it will remain inferior to the justice of God's law. These laws are repressive, and are 
seen as an example of worshipping another God and all Muslims should violently reject 
these laws. Simply one application of the Islamic law would be more then enough to 
immediately remove all crimes of, for example, stealing.
246
 
 
 As a result of this view of the shari'a, the application of this utopian vision of the 
law is seen as a political goal of the Salafi movement in Egypt in the post-2011 period, 
                                                 
244 Yāssir Burhāmī, Al Amr bil Ma'rūf (Alexandria: Dar al 'Aqeeda, 2006). 
245 Baber Johansen, “Signs As Evidence: The Doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyya on 
Proof,” in Islamic Law and Society, 9, 2, 2002, 168-193. 
246 “Al Qawānīn al Wad'iyya Ṭaghūt Yu'bad min Dūn Allāh – Al Ḥuwainī,” YouTube video, 2:48, from 
Friday sermon, posted by “ALIslamDeeny.” 29 Sep 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9Qr6UmImp8.  
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and remains a part of the program of Salafi political organizations and societal 
organizations.
247
  
 
Relationship with Society 
 Salafis see Muslims and particularly the cause of Islam in a place of permanent 
weakness and war against its three greatest enemies: the Jews, the Christians, and the 
liberals. They must always be on the defensive and prepared for an impending conflict 
with these groups to reject their oppression and the introduction of their ideas into Islamic 
thought.
248
 Examples of this can be seen in the often-violent relationship taken with 
minority Christians in Egypt as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 Because many of the issues discussed by Salafis are drawn directly from 
theological debates, many times the conflict is framed as one between faith and disbelief, 
leading many Salafis to see themselves as the only true Muslims. For example, 
parliament member Mamdouḥ Isma'īl, a representative from the Jamā' Islāmiyya which 
has significant Salafi roots, decided to stand in the middle of a session and announce the 
call to prayer in protest of the speaker Sa'd al Katātnī, a high-ranking member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, refusing to stop the session for prayer. He was censured by the 
speaker who commented “you are no more religious than anyone else here.”249 
 
Limitations of Opinion 
 Salafi preachers often point to their acceptance of multiple opinions and 
interpretations of the religious texts, citing the differences that appeared between the 
Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad as proof that the religion of Islam is wide enough 
to accommodate a range of views, making it applicable for all eras and places. 
 
                                                 
247 “Al Barnāmij al Siyāsi,” Ḥizb al Nour, accessed 18 Feb 2012, 
http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_poilitcal. 
248 Ali Juma', Al Mutashaddidūn (Cairo: Dar al Muqattam, 2011) 10 – 12. 
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 However, there is one major condition to this acceptance of other opinions: in any 
case where two opinions existed between the Salaf or other Muslim scholars, no modern 
scholar can offer a third opinion outside this original context. This point was clearly 
articulated by Salafi preachers in their response to the niqāb debate as presented in 
Chapter 3. Salafis argued Muslim scholars throughout history placed the face veil into 
two categories: required (wājib) or preferred (mustaḥabb). Therefore, any opinion 
presented by a modern scholar such as Al Ṭanṭāwī, ‘Ali Juma’, or others calling it 
allowed (mubāḥ), hated (makrūh), or forbidden (ḥarām) is not allowed, and that they can 
only choose one of the two presented by earlier scholars.
250
 This point impairs the debate 
between Salafis and their opponents, restricting them to a particular historical context and 
forbidding the introduction of present circumstances. 
 
Malleability 
 A central aspect of the Salafi methodology and what tends to create the most 
confusion is that the speakers of this movement are malleable, willing to completely 
abandon a strict attachment to the texts of the Qur'ān and Sunna in support of an 
alternative opinion.  
 
 In the field of media, Salafis have radically changed their opinions over time, 
mainly to reflect changing methods of communication and to allow their movement to 
grow. Al Albānī has an entire book on the subject, entirely banning television, video 
recordings, live broadcasts, and even religious lessons through television.
251
 This opinion 
was approved in Egypt by al Ḥuwainī, who in his collection of questions to Al Albānī 
asked on the subject. Over the course of a 15-minute discussion on the issue, al Ḥuwainī 
asked on a wide range of theoretical subjects, attempting to find some aspect of television 
that might be allowed, without receiving any positive response from al Albānī.252 
                                                 
250 “Radd al Sheikh Māzin al Sirsāwī al Qawī 'alá Sheikh al Azhar,” YouTube video, 5:15, from Al Nas 
satellite channel, posted by “teacher4all.” 9 Oct 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vu-
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However, with the development of satellite channels as one of the main methods 
to spread the Salafi movement, these opinions quickly changed. In Saudi Arabia, ibn 
Uthaymayn, in a video recording of his religious opinions, he completely allowed 
photography and video recordings, unless they were subject to alteration.
253
 In Egypt, Al 
Ḥuwainī now completely allows religious programming and the keeping of a television, 
as long as it does not present non-Islamic subjects. Muḥammad Ḥassān has remained on 
the fence and continues to present both opinions on the matter, however stating his 
preference for the permissibility of video and suggesting that those who still hold to the 
old interpretation are both ignorant and have a valid point.
254
 
 
 Secondly is in the approach to the niqāb. Traditionally, Salafis reject any 
attachment to the schools of jurisprudence, and consistently attack these schools and their 
major scholars as ignoring the clear evidence from the Qur'ān and the Sunna. However, 
once confronted with the issue Salafi preachers retreated from the original sources as well 
as the first three generations of Muslims, using the opinions of the schools of 
jurisprudence to justify their stance and sidelining any reference to their traditional 
methodology of the Qur'ān, Sunna, and opinions of the Salaf. 
 
 Finally, this malleability can be seen in the ruling of forbidding the dropping of 
the robes to the floor, or Isbāl al Izār. All of the Prophetic Hadiths on the subject clearly 
refer to the prohibition of dropping robes because it was an ancient Arabian sign of pride, 
and that Islam wished to remove these old societal differences to create a more equal 
society. Arguably, in modern society this is no longer a problem, and therefore the ruling 
should be changed. Abu Isḥāq al Ḥuwainī, after being confronted with this fact, then 
abandons his methodology and ignores the clear evidence of the Sunna in favor of his 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ishāq al Ḥuwainī, Tape 41, 20:00 – 35:00.  
253 “Ḥukm al Taṣwīr l-ibn Uthaymīn,” YouTube video, 3:12, recorded mosque discussion, posted by 
“alothaimeen.” 7 Jul 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eN2zgo7MG5k.  
254 “Ḥukm al Taṣwīr fi al Islām lil Sheikh Muḥammad Ḥassān,” YouTube video, 7:09, from Al Rahma 
satellite channel, posted by “m3nani.” 30 May 2010, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_w4TT4VP1Gk. 
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personal stance, citing the individual opinion of Shāf'ī scholar Al Nawawī who saw the 
Ḥadīths against dropping robes as a general ban.255 
 
Difference in Approach: Citizenship 
 To provide a clearer picture of the different approaches taken between Salafis and 
modern reformers, this study shall use the example of citizenship. As presented in 
Chapter 3, Salafi scholars see the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
general as one based upon religious status, rejecting the concept of citizenship. The 
Muslims, who have “opened” the country through a military invasion, have been 
determined by God as the natural leaders of the society, and they under no circumstances 
may have themselves subjected to a lower position. Non-Muslims or Kuffār, on the other 
hand, are considered to be under a protected or Dhimma status which although guarantees 
a state of peace with the Muslim army requires the payment of the Jizya and prevents 
them from holding higher political office or having control over affairs of those other 
than those of their co-religionists. The evidence given for this view is based upon a 
number of Qur’ānic verses in which God rejects the taking of non-believers as Awliā’, 
commonly translated in English as friends or helpers in place of Believers.
256
 
 
 This description is strongly literalist, and does not integrate the historical context, 
nor alternative legal opinions. Terms such as Muslim, Dhimmī, and Kāfir are presented 
without context, and exist only in their outward, linguistic state. 
  
Modern reformers such as Fahmy Huweidy, Tāriq al Bishrī, and Muḥammad 
‘Imāra, however, use as their foundation not the Qur’ānic verses itself, but rather through 
viewing how these verses and subsequent Hadiths were applied in the Muslim 
community and by jurists. Huweidy begins by stating that Dhimma is a word not found in 
                                                 
255 Al Atharī, Samṭ al La’ālī, 53 – 67.  
256 Qur’ān 3:28, “Let not the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather than believers: if any 
do that, in nothing will there be help from God, except by way of precaution, that ye may guard 
yourselves from them…” Translated by Abdullah Yusuf ‘Ali. 
“َِّ  للّٱََّنِمََّسَْيَلفََِّكل ََٰذَّْلَعَْفيَّنَمَوََّنِينِمْؤ  مْلٱَِّنو دَّنِمََّٓءَاِيلَْوأََّنيِِرف ََٰكْلٱََّنو نِمْؤ  مْلٱَِّذِخ َتيََّ  لاَِّإَّ  ءْىَشَِّىفًًََّّۭة ََٰىق تَّْم هْنِمَّ
 او ق َتتََّنأَّٓ  لا “ 
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the Qur’ān but used by the Prophet Muḥammad for descriptive purposes, without any 
legal intention. He agrees that over time this term became the primary method through 
which non-Muslims living in Muslim lands were described in legal texts; however he 
strongly argues against this understanding by citing a number of statements from the 
Qur’ān, Sunna, the Salaf, and legal schools that stress equality, even between those of 
different religion. Finally, Huweidy also cites the historical context in which this 
approach is placed.
257
 This opinion is repeated and elaborated on by ‘Imāra.258 
 
Al Bishrī takes a similar stance, however ignoring much of the religious 
discussion and moving directly towards a presentation of historical circumstances. 
Muslims and Christians in Egypt have in his opinion consistently worked together as one, 
creating a shared identity. First nurtured under the rule of Muḥammad ‘Ali, this 
relationship has developed into the modern concept of citizenship and become one of the 
most important aspects of national identity. In his introduction, he argues against those 
who cite Qur’ānic verses and states that if such a relationship was contradictory to the 
foundational principles of Islam then scholars and the society would have risen against it, 
which clearly was not the case.
259
  
 
 As a result of these approaches, the three reformers cited here agree that Muslims 
and non-Muslims in the modern nation-state can be recognized as citizens, equal under 
the law and sharing both rights and responsibilities. There is no obstacle to a non-Muslim 
reaching a high political office such as that of President, as the office of the Egyptian 
President is not to act as the Imām or Wāli in a traditional Qur’ānic sense, but is rather 
one part of the national leadership structure. The leader is freely chosen by the will of the 
population, subject to election, and works in coordination with the society as a whole 
towards achieving the nation’s goals. 
 
                                                 
257 Fahmy Huweidy, Muwāṭinūn lā Dhimmiyyūn (Cairo: Dar al Shorouk, 1999) 110 – 116. 
258 Muḥammad ‘Imāra, Ukdhūbat al Iṭṭihāḍ al Dīnī fī Misr (Cairo: Dar al Salam, 2000). 
259 Ṭāriq al Bishrī, Al Muslimūn wa al Aqbāṭ fī Iṭār al Jamā’a al Waṭaniyya (Cairo: Al Hay’a al ‘Amma lil 
Kitab, 1981). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
What is Salafism? 
 There is little information to suggest the existence of a group known as Salafis 
anytime from the outset of Islamic history until well into the modern era. The word Salafi 
has been used by countless Sunni writers in an attempt to provide a connection to the 
beloved first three generations of Muslims, providing for them a form of legitimacy for 
their own thoughts through a connection to the beginnings of Islam. Whether in debates 
with theological foes, or simply in legal discussions, this term could be used to defeat 
opponents, avoid accusations of innovation and therefore allow a wider audience for their 
ideas. Modern groups calling themselves Salafis have gone through the same process of 
legitimization, searching through the annals of Islamic works to find almost anyone 
whom they can attach to their line of thought. Unfortunately, however, most Western and 
even Muslim writers tend to agree with the modern Salafi interpretation that this is a 
group of ancient puritans that have existed from the beginning, following what they feel 
is the true version of Islam juxtaposed to either philosophers or liberal jurists and 
reformers. 
 
 What is clear is that throughout Islamic history there have been a number of 
movements that call Muslims to reform such as that of Ibn Taymiyya, Muḥammad ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Ibn Fūdi, Shāh Walī Allāh al Dahlawī, and those in modern Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt. These movements, however, are not based upon abstract philosophical 
trends in the religion but rather entirely upon the particular historical and social 
circumstances in which they developed. True, they all center around one common factor: 
an apprehension to bid’a or innovation in the religion and the desire to cleanse society 
from these innovations. However, each group interpreted the influence of bid’a and the 
solution to this problem in entirely different ways. The movements of Ibn Fūdi and Shāh 
Walī Allāh al Dahlawī were based strongly around Sufism, while Sayyid Aḥmad Khān 
had Sufi beginnings but eventually developed into his claim to be the Mahdi. Both of 
these concepts are completely rejected by modern-day Salafis.  
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 In the Egyptian context, modern Salafism is a movement started by a number of 
young Egyptians in the 1970s. Before this time other movements existed such as the 
Anṣār Al Sunna and the Jamā' Islāmiyya, but these movements worked largely in 
cooperation with the state and differed fundamentally in terms of methodology from the 
modern movements.
260
 
 
 In their lifetime, these individuals witnessed fundamental shifts in Egyptian 
society to allow free education for all citizens and a social network that would allow them 
and their peers to enter for the first time the urban setting and enhance their social status. 
Upon their arrival in the cities, however, they would witness the failures of Nasserism 
and the Open Door policy of the Sadat regime to provide true development and 
advancement for the nation. As the problems of society continued to increase they then 
turned to the only recourse that they had at their direct disposal given their background: a 
deeper attachment to religion. At the time the historical setting also was calling for a 
return to religion. The destruction of the Arab armies at the hands of Israel in 1967 and 
the interpretation of this defeat showed a large number of Egyptians that Islam was the 
only answer. 
 
 Unfortunately, the traditional religious institutions and in particular Al Azhar had 
come largely under state control and were tied directly to the politics of the regime, 
rendering them to a secondary position in the social structure. Those in the organized 
religious opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood, were violently pursued by the government 
and subject to imprisonment and in some cases torture and execution at the hands of the 
authorities. Therefore, there was a need to seek an alternative religious interpretation. 
Some of these influences would come domestically in the form of radical preachers such 
as ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Kishk who would speak out against the government's oppressive 
practices, or Sayyid Sābiq whose works sought to redefine Islamic Law along the lines of 
the literal interpretation of the Qur'ān and Sunna. However, the majority of their 
influences would come from the preachers of Saudi Arabia and those who were directly 
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supported by the Saudi government such as Nāṣir al Dīn al Albānī, 'Abd Allah bin Bāz, or 
Ṣāliḥ ibn 'Uthaymayn. 
 
 The oil boom of the 1970s allowed all the governments in the Gulf States an 
unprecedented amount of financial assets which allowed them to publish books, tapes, 
and other materials from their preachers with the desire to increase their influence and 
promote their interpretation of the religion, particularly in Saudi Arabia which sought to 
spread its Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. The millions of Egyptian workers and students 
who would in the subsequent years travel to the Gulf to take advantage of these new 
sources of income would be heavily influenced by this campaign, with many Salafi 
preachers spending long amounts of time in the country and continuing to make regular 
trips to countries such as Saudi Arabia for religious lessons. Many Egyptians were taught 
in Saudi Arabia that this new wealth was a sign of God's acceptance of the puritanical 
doctrine, and that if they were to remove innovation back home, they too could see 
worldly benefits.  
 
 As they returned to their homeland, these Egyptians would begin to preach their 
new message, pushed forward by the continued growth of problems in Egyptian society, 
the failure of traditional Islamic institutions to handle these problems, and the financial 
backing of the Gulf. Keeping their campaign primarily in the rural areas at first and using 
popular methods of communication such as cassette tapes, the movement remained 
largely untouched by the regime. 
 
 At the dawn of the 21
st
 Century, the Salafis had spread their message into the 
cities and, with the help of new mediums of communication such as satellite television 
and the Internet, were now able to reach the widest audiences in their history. The 
government then began to see this advancement as a threat, and took measures to crack 
down but political circumstances resulting in the 25
th
 of January 2011 Revolution would 
not allow these restrictions to continue.  
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 Rather, these events would see the Salafi movement enter politics and become one 
of the most powerful political blocks in the country, driving the debates that will 
significantly impact the future composition of Egyptian society. 
 
 Ultimately, this is not a movement simply imported from the Gulf or part of a 
general turn to textualism in Islam. Rather it is the result of local historical, cultural, 
economic, and overall social circumstances that pushed individuals to seek religious 
solutions to the problems they saw around them. Perhaps the clearest representation of 
the movement in Egypt was given by The Arab newspaper when it called Salafism: 
 
"برقأ ىلإ ةنويفلأا يتلا صتمت احةل ناقتحلاا ىدل عراشلا يرصملا وذخأت نم ةحاسم اضرلا 
وملاستسلاا”. 
 
 “Close to the opium that draws out the state of congestion and confusion in the 
 Egyptian street and takes from the space of self-gratitude and surrender.”261 
 
Methodology 
 The methodology of the Salafi movement in Egypt is one based upon “selective 
literalism,” with members attempting to stay as close as possible to a strict interpretation 
of the Qur'ān and Sunna in the topics and issues they choose. However, there are many 
circumstances in which this is not possible, and the movement is forced to adapt. For 
example, once many of the Salafi preachers returned from their time in the Gulf, they 
quickly realized that the harsh, uncompromising dialogue traditionally presented in the 
mosques of Saudi Arabia and many Salafi works was not attractive to an Egyptian 
audience. Therefore, there was a need to introduce elements of spirituality. Although 
strongly against Sufism in general, Salafis integrated elements of Sufism such as the 
purification of the heart, tawakkul or reliance upon God, to even stating that those with 
the highest levels of faith cry upon hearing the Qur’ān or about the tribulations witnessed 
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7588, 22 March 2009, p. 25.   
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by the Prophet Muḥammad during his lifetime.262 
 
 The issues chosen by the Salafis are those that deal heavily with those of acts of 
worship and common morality, agreed-upon by the majority of their audiences. Many of 
the discussions and debates proposed by the Salafi movement remain highly abstract such 
as how one should love God or the moral merits of the Companions. This is done to both 
avoid internal conflict and maintain popularity. When the Salafis venture away from this 
discourse and begin to discuss pertinent legal issues or societal problems, however, 
conflict ensues. 
 
Relationship with Classical Islam 
 In their interpretation of Islamic Law, the positions of Salafis are not a significant 
departure from the classical religious opinions, particularly its stricter interpretations. 
This has led analysts such as Ḥassan al Saqqāf to classify them legally as simply modern 
Hanbalis.
263
 What is important to note, however, is that this attachment to classical 
approaches to the religion completely ignores the modern circumstances in which 
problems appear. In politics, for example, the interpretation of the just Quraish male 
Khalīfa or Imam ignores the modern development of the nation state system. In 
economics, Muslims simply paying their mandatory alms taxes or gathering donations 
from citizens to cover a lack of US foreign aid shows a lack of understanding of even the 
most simple modern financial concepts. Additionally, in stark opposition to the Islamic 
legal tradition, the starting point from analysis was not reality, rather theoretical situations 
provided by their sources that they then force on reality. 
 
Attempts at Dialogue and Reconciliation 
 Particularly since the Revolution and the entry of the Salafi movement into the 
political realm, there have been a number of attempts to reconcile the opinions of the 
Salafi movement with that of other groups in the society, including liberals and 
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Christians. Newspaper editor Khālid Ṣalāh appeared a number of times on satellite 
channels alongside Muḥammad Ḥassān, claiming to bridge the gaps between Salafis and 
liberals,
264
 and even a group of wealthy Salafis invited citizens to meetings at a local 
coffee chain.
265
 These movements have largely failed, with the Salafis refusing to 
compromise and claiming that their stances on issues are not personal opinions but rather 
aspects of religious doctrine. This study therefore concludes that dialogue and 
reconciliation with the Salafi movement will be possible once the Salafis are prepared to 
begin engaging other elements of Egyptian society as equals with different opinions, and 
not as subjects to be preached to and saved from their innovations. At this point, they 
could be brought in as a constructive aspect of the national dialogue, using their 
grassroots and rural support to enact positive societal change. 
 
 What does act as a positive point is the malleability of the Salafi methodology to 
the point that, when needed, preachers are willing to forego aspects of their methodology 
to adopt opinions that will see them remain relevant in the societal discourse, with only a 
few such as Wagdy Ghuneim remaining firm in their opinions. This can be seen 
particularly in their approach to democracy, elections, political protests, and the niqāb. 
This openness to adapt represents one of the most interesting aspects of the Salafi 
methodology, has kept them popular to the point of this study, and arguably could 
continually be used as a way out of confrontation, leading to the moderation of the 
group's opinions. 
 
Position of Al Azhar and the Future 
 Many commentators in Egypt have claimed that the Salafi movement will begin 
to dissipate once the traditional Islamic institutions such as Al Azhar return to their 
previous place as leaders in the Muslim World. After the institution's legal and financial 
independence from the political regime, which according to them was the reason for its 
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fall in the first place, the renewed strength will allow Al Azhar to stand against this 
growing tide of Salafism. 
 
 What this viewpoint does not take into account is that aspects of the Salafi 
methodology have become standard at Al Azhar itself. A number of professors in both 
religious and secular departments actively support the Salafi movement, with some major 
speakers mentioned in this study as Māzin Al Sirsāwī and ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-'Azīz 
reaching the level of department head and others such as Muḥammad al Saghīr, even 
participating on panels to alter the religious curriculum taught to Azhar primary and 
secondary students. Many members of the Salafi movement such as Yāssir al Burhāmī 
and Muḥammad Ḥassān hold degrees from Al Azhar. Additionally, in public lessons even 
those teachers considered to be against the Salafi movement in the areas of Jurisprudence 
and Hadith promote many of the same approaches as those of Salafis, attaching to a strict 
interpretation of the roots of Islamic heritage and seriously questioning any attempt at 
modernization.
266
 Most students of the university have come to embody this ideology, 
and the Salafi movement continues to hold a number of popular speaking events inside 
the Al Azhar University campuses both at the main facilities in Cairo as well as its 
regional branches. Therefore, this study does not believe that the moderation of the Salafi 
movement will come from the development or independence of Al Azhar. 
 
 Two things alone will result in the alteration of the Salafi movement. The first will 
be removing the economic and social conditions in which the Salafi movement thrives. 
Rural development, the enhanced quality of education, and an overall improvement of the 
economic situation faced by average Egyptians. The second, as implied by Wagdy 
Ghoneim, will be the introduction of Salafis into the political mainstream. Being forced 
to deal with the everyday realities of governance will require the Salafi movement to 
slowly abandon their discourse of abstract discussions and either drastically change their 
approach to adapt or risk collapse. 
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